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Dedicated to the memory of Rudolf Ahlswede
Abstract. We show strongly secret achievable rate regions for two dif-
ferent wiretap multiple-access channel coding problems. In the first prob-
lem, each encoder has a private message and both together have a com-
mon message to transmit. The encoders have entropy-limited access to
common randomness. If no common randomness is available, then the
achievable region derived here does not allow for the secret transmis-
sion of a common message. The second coding problem assumes that
the encoders do not have a common message nor access to common ran-
domness. However, they may have a conferencing link over which they
may iteratively exchange rate-limited information. This can be used to
form a common message and common randomness to reduce the sec-
ond coding problem to the first one. We give the example of a channel
where the achievable region equals zero without conferencing or common
randomness and where conferencing establishes the possibility of secret
message transmission. Both coding problems describe practically rele-
vant networks which need to be secured against eavesdropping attacks.
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1 Introduction
The wiretap Multiple-Access Channel (MAC) combines two areas where Rudolf
Ahlswede has made major contributions. In the area of multi-user information
theory, he [9] and Liao [25] independently gave one of the first complete charac-
terizations of the capacity region of a multi-user channel – the MAC with one
message per sender. Later, Dueck [18] proved the strong converse for the MAC
and Ahlswede [10] gave an elementary proof immediately afterwards. Slepian
and Wolf generalized the results from [9] and [25] to the case where the senders
additionally have a common message [32]. Willems used Slepian and Wolf’s re-
sult to derive the capacity region of the MAC with conferencing encoders. This
is a MAC without common message, but the encoders can exchange rate-limited
information about their messages in an interactive conferencing protocol [38, 39].
The results of Slepian and Wolf as well as Willems’ result were only recently gen-
eralized to general compound MACs with partial channel state information in
[37], arbitrarily varying MACs with conferencing encoders were treated in [36].
The latter paper made substantial use of techniques developed by Ahlswede
for single-sender arbitrarily varying channels in [1–3] and also of his and Cai’s
contribution to arbitrarily varying MACs [5].
The other area of Ahlswede’s interest which plays a role in this paper is
secrecy and common randomness. Among other problems, he considered together
with Csisza´r in [6, 7] how a secret key can be shared at distant terminals in
the presence of an eavesdropper. Work on secret key sharing aided by public
communication goes back to Maurer [28]. The first paper which exploits the
statistics of a discrete memoryless channel to establish secret communication is
due to Wyner [40]. He considers the wiretap channel, the simplest model of a
communication scenario where secrecy is relevant: a sender would like to transmit
a message to a receiver over a discrete memoryless channel and transmission is
overheard by a second receiver who should be kept ignorant of the message. It
was noted by Wyner that a secret key shared at both legitimate terminals is not
necessary to establish secret transmission – if the channel statistics are taken
into consideration, it is sufficient that the sender randomizes his inputs in order
to secure transmission.
Since Wyner discovered this fact, information-theoretic secrecy for message
transmission without a key shared between sender and legitimate receiver has
been generalized in various directions. The first paper on multi-user information-
theoretic security is due to Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [15]. Here, the second receiver
only is a partial eavesdropper: there is a common message intended for both
receivers, but as in the original wiretap channel, an additional private message
intended for the first receiver must be kept secret from the second. We come to
multiple-access models below. An overview over the area is given in [24].
The original secrecy criterion used in [40] and [15] and in most of the sub-
sequent work until today has become known as the “weak secrecy criterion”.
Given a code, it measures the mutual information normalized by the code block-
length between the randomly chosen message and the eavesdropper’s output
corresponding to the application of the code and transmission over the chan-
nel. Maurer introduced the “strong secrecy criterion” in [29] by omitting the
normalization. The advantage of this criterion was revealed in [11]: it can be
given an operational meaning, i.e. one can specify the attacks it withstands. It
is possible to show that if transmission obeys the strong secrecy criterion, then
the eavesdropper’s average error tends to one for any decoder it might apply.
Translated into practical secrecy schemes, this means that no matter how large
the computing power of a possible eavesdropper might be, it will not succeed in
breaking the security of this scheme. For the weak criterion, there are still only
heuristic argumentations as to why it should be secret. Further secrecy metrics
are presented in [12], but without giving them an operational meaning, strong
secrecy remains the strongest of these metrics. To our knowledge, there are three
different approaches to establishing strong secrecy in a wiretap channel so far
[28, 14, 17]. In fact, the last of these approaches also applies to classical-quantum
wiretap channels [17] and also was used to give an achievable rate for the classical
compound wiretap channel [11].
There exist many MAC models where secrecy is an issue. This may even
be the case when there is no eavesdropper, as each encoder might have access
to noisy observations of the other sender’s codeword but wants to protect its
own message from decoding at the other sender [27, 23, 19]. The case where the
encoders have access to generalized feedback but only keep their messages se-
cret from an external eavesdropper is considered in [33]. In the cognitive MAC,
only one encoder has a private message, and together, the encoders have a com-
mon message. There are again two cases: In the case without an eavesdropper,
the encoder without a private message has access to the codeword sent by the
other encoder through a noisy channel and must be kept ignorant of the other
encoder’s private message [26]. In [31], the cognitive MAC without feedback
was investigated where the messages must be kept secret from an eavesdropper
and the encoders have unrestricted access to common randomness. All of these
papers use the weak secrecy criterion.
The first part of this article generalizes and strengthens the achievability
result from [20] where multi-letter characterizations of an achievable region and
of an outer bound on the capacity region of a MAC without common message
and with an external eavesdropper under the weak secrecy criterion are given.
The channel needs to satisfy certain relatively strong conditions for the bounds
to work. Extensions to the Gaussian case can be found in [20, 34, 21].
We consider two senders Alice1 and Alice2. Each has a private message and
together they have a common message. This message triple must be transmitted
to Bob over a discrete memoryless MAC in such a way that Eve who obtains a
version of the sent codewords through another discrete memoryless MAC cannot
decode the messages. We apply the strong secrecy criterion. In order to find a
code which satisfies this criterion, we use Devetak’s approach [17], which in the
quantum case builds on the Ahlswede-Winter lemma [8] and classically on a
Chernoff bound. It is similar to the approach taken in [13]. As the senders have
a common message and as the second part of the paper deals with the wiretap
MAC with conferencing encoders, we assume that the encoders have access to
a restricted amount of common randomness. Common randomness for encoding
has so far only been used in [31], but without setting any limitations on its
amount. Note that this use of common randomness in order to establish secrecy
differs from the use made in [6, 7]. We only obtain an achievable region. In this
achievable region it is not possible to transmit a common message if no common
randomness is available. Further it is notable that we use random coding and
have to apply time-sharing before derandomizing.
The wiretap MAC with common message and common randomness is also
needed in the second part of this paper about the wiretap MAC with confer-
encing encoders. Conferencing was introduced by Willems in [38, 39] and is an
iterative protocol for the senders of a MAC to exchange information about their
messages. One assumes that the amount of information that is exchanged is
rate-limited because otherwise one would obtain a single-encoder wiretap MAC.
Willems already used the coding theorem for the MAC with common message to
deduce an achievable region for the conferencing MAC. The same can be done
for the wiretap MAC with conferencing encoders. More precisely, aside from the
senders’ private messages, there are no further messages to be transmitted, and
no common randomness is available. However, conferencing is used to produce
both a common message and common randomness, which allows the reduction.
A consequence of the fact that no common message can be transmitted by the
wiretap MAC with common message if there is no common randomness is that
one has to use conferencing to establish some common randomness if this is
supposed to enlarge the achievable region compared to what would be achiev-
able without conferencing. Again, this consequence presumes that the achievable
region equals the capacity region even though we cannot prove this.
Information-theoretic security has far-reaching practical consequences. As
digital communication replaces more and more of the classical paper-based ways
of communication even for the transmission of sensible data, the problem of se-
curing these data becomes increasingly important. Information-theoretic secrecy
provides an alternative to the traditional cryptographic approach which bases on
the assumption of limited computing power. However, as information-theoretic
security uses the imperfections of the channels to secure data, its models must be
sufficiently complex to describe realistic scenarios. Our article shows how encoder
cooperation can be utilized to secure data. The cooperation of base stations in
mobile networks is included in future wireless network standards, and our work
can be seen as a contribution to the theoretical analysis of how it fares when
it comes to security. But already Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s paper on the broadcast
channel with confidential messages shows how messages with different secrecy
requirements can be combined in one transmission. A more recent example which
also applies the strong secrecy criterion is given in [41].
Organization of the paper: The next section introduces the general model
of a wiretap MAC and also presents the Willems conferencing protocol. Section
3 contains the two achievability theorems for the wiretap MAC with common
message and the wiretap MAC with conferencing encoders.
The common message theorem is treated in the rather long Section 4. First,
the regions we claim to be achievable are decomposed into regions whose achiev-
ability can be shown more easily. Following Devetak, it is shown that it is suffi-
cient to make Eve’s output probability given a message triple almost independent
of this triple in terms of variation distance. Then, in the mathematical core of
the paper, we derive lower bounds on the randomness necessary to achieve strong
secrecy using probabilistic concentration results. Here we also follow Devetak.
Having derived these bounds, we finally find a realization of the random codes
which defines a good wiretap code.
Section 5 gives the proof of the achievability theorem for the wiretap MAC
with conferencing encoders. We again have to decompose the claimed regions
into regions whose achievability can be shown more easily. Then we can reduce
the problem of achieving a certain rate pair with conferencing to the problem
of achieving a certain rate triple by the wiretap MAC with common message
more or less in the same way as done by Willems in the non-wiretap situation.
Finally, Section 6 shows that conferencing may help in situations where no secret
transmission is possible without and that for our approach it is necessary to do
the time-sharing within the random coding.
Notation: For sets {1, . . . ,M}, where M is a positive integer, we use the com-
binatorial shorthand [M ]. For a real number x we define [x]+ := max{x, 0}.
For any set X and subset A ⊂ X we write Ac := X \A. We let 1A : X →
{0, 1} be the indicator function of A which takes on the value 1 at x ∈ X if and
only if x ∈ A. Given a probability space (Ω,A ,P) we write E for the expectation
corresponding to P and for A ∈ A and a real-valued random variable X we write
E[X ;A] := E[X1A].
The space of probability distributions on the finite set X is denoted by
P(X ). In particular, it contains for every x ∈ X the probability measure δx
defined by δx(x) = 1. The product of two probability distributions P and Q
is denoted by P ⊗ Q. A stochastic matrix with input alphabet X and output
alphabet Z is written as a mapping W : X → P(Z ). The n-fold memoryless
extension of a channel W : X → P(Z ) is denoted by W⊗n, so that for x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n and z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Z n,
W⊗n(z|x) =
n∏
i=1
W (zi|xi).
We also define for P ∈ P(X ) andW : X → P(Z ) the probability distribution
P ⊗W ∈ P(X ×Z ) by (P ⊗W )(x, z) = P (x)W (z|x).
Every measure µ on the finite set X can be identified with a unique function
µ : X → [0,∞]. Then for any subset A ⊂ X we have µ(A) =
∑
x∈A µ(x). On
the set of measures on X , we define the total variation distance by
‖µ1 − µ2‖ :=
∑
x∈X
|µ1(x)− µ2(x)|.
Given a random variable X living on X and a P ∈ P(X ), we mean by X ∼
P that P is the distribution of X . Given a pair of random variables (X,Y ) taking
values in the finite set X ×Y , we write PX ∈ P(X ) for the distribution of X
and PX|Y for the conditional distribution ofX given Y . We also write T
n
X,δ ⊂ X
n
for the subset of δ-typical sequences with respect to X and T nX|Y,δ(y) ⊂ Y
n
for the subset of conditionally δ-typical sequences with respect to PX|Y given
y ∈ Y n. Given a sequence x ∈ X n and an x ∈ X , we let N(x|x) be the number
of coordinates of x equal to x.
For random variables X,Y, Z we write H(X) for the entropy of X , H(X |Y )
for the conditional entropy of X given Y , I(X ∧ Y ) for the mutual information
of X and Y and I(X ∧ Y |Z) for the conditional mutual information of X and
Y given Z.
Acknowledgment: We would like to thank A. J. Pierrot for bringing the
papers [30] and [42] to our attention. They consider strong secrecy problems in
multi-user settings with the help of resolvability theory. In particular, in [42], an
achievable region for the wiretap MAC without common message or conferencing
is derived.
2 The Wiretap Multiple-Access Channel
The wiretap Multiple-Access Channel (MAC) is described by a stochastic matrix
W : X × Y → T ×Z ,
where X ,Y ,T ,Z are finite sets. We writeWb andWe for the marginal channels
to T and Z , so e.g.
Wb(t|x, y) :=
∑
z∈Z
W (t, z|x, y).
X and Y are the finite alphabets of Alice1 and Alice2, respectively. T is the
finite alphabet of the receiver called Bob and the outputs received by the eaves-
dropper Eve are elements of the finite alphabet Z .
2.1 With Common Message
Let HC be a nonnegative real number. A wiretap MAC code with common mes-
sage and blocklength n satisfying the common randomness bound HC consists
of a stochastic matrix
G : [K0]× [K1]× [K2]→ P(X
n × Y n)
and a decoding function
ϕ : T n → [K0]× [K1]× [K2].
G is required to have the form
G(x,y|k0, k1, k2) =
∑
j∈J
G0(j|k0)G1(x|k0, k1, j)G2(y|k0, k2, j),
where J is some finite set and
G0 : [K0]→ P(J ),
G1 : [K0]× [K1]×J → P(X ),
G2 : [K0]× [K2]×J → P(Y ).
Further, G0 has to satisfy that H(J |M0) ≤ nHC for M0 uniformly distributed
on [K0] and PJ|M0 = G0. [K0] is called the set of common messages, [K1] is the
set of Alice1’s private messages and [K2] the set of Alice2’s private messages.
Let M0,M1,M2 be independent random variables uniformly distributed on
[K0], [K1] and [K2], respectively. Further, let X
n, Y n, T n, Zn be random vari-
ables such that for (x,y, t, z) ∈ X n × Y n ×T n ×Z n
PXnY n|M0M1M2(x,y|k0, k1, k2) = G(x,y|k0, k1, k2),
PTnZn|XnY nM0M1M2(t, z|x,y, k0 , k1, k2) =W
⊗n(t, z|x,y).
Then the average error of the code defined above equals
P[ϕ(T n) 6= (M0,M1,M2)].
Definition 2.1. A rate pair (R0, R1, R2) ∈ R
3
≥0 is achievable by the wiretap
MAC with common message under the common randomness bound HC ≥ 0
if for every η > 0 and every ε ∈ (0, 1) and n large there exists a wiretap MAC
code with common message and blocklength n satisfying the common randomness
bound HC and
1
n
logKν ≥ Rν − η (ν = 0, 1, 2),
P[ϕ(T n) 6= (M0,M1,M2)] ≤ ε,
I(Zn ∧M0M1M2) ≤ ε.
Remark 2.2. It was shown in [11] that no matter how Eve tries to decode the
messages from the Alices, the average error must tend to one. More precisely,
assume that a wiretap code with common message and blocklength n is given,
and assume that Eve has a decoding function
χ : Z n → [K0]× [K1]× [K2].
Then
P[χ(Zn) 6= (M0,M1,M2)] ≥ 1− ε
′
for some ε′ which tends to zero as ε tends to zero. If ε tends to zero exponentially
fast and K0,K1,K2 grow exponentially, then ε
′ tends to zero at exponential
speed.
More generally assume that f : [K0] × [K1] × [K2] → [K
′] is a function
satisfying P[f(M0,M1,M2) = k
′] = 1/K ′ for all k′ ∈ [K ′]. Then with the same
argument as in [11] one can show that for every function g : Z n → [K ′], one
has P[f(M) 6= g(Zn)] ≥ 1− 1/K ′− ε′ for the same ε′ as above. That is, even for
K ′ = 2, blind guessing is the best way for Eve to estimate f(M). In particular,
no subset of the message random variables, like M0 or (M1,M2), can be reliably
decoded by Eve.
2.2 With Conferencing Encoders
In the wiretap MAC with conferencing encoders, Alice1 and Alice2 do not have a
common message nor common randomness. However before forming their code-
words, they may exchange some information about their private messages accord-
ing to an iterative and randomized “conferencing” protocol whose deterministic
form was introduced by Willems [38, 39]. If the respective message sets are [K1]
and [K2], such a stochastic Willems conference can be described as follows. Let
finite sets J1 and J2 be given which can be written as products
Jν = Jν,1 × . . .×Jν,I (ν = 1, 2)
for some positive integer I which does not depend on ν. A Willems conferenc-
ing stochastic matrix c completely describing such a conference is determined
in an iterative manner via sequences of stochastic matrices c1,1, . . . , c1,I and
c2,1, . . . , c2,I . c1,i describes the probability distribution of what Alice1 tells Alice2
in the i-th conferencing iteration given the knowledge accumulated so far at
Alice1. Thus in general, using the notation
ν¯ :=
{
1 if ν = 2,
2 if ν = 1,
these stochastic matrices satisfy for ν = 1, 2 and i = 2, . . . , I,
cν,1 : [Kν ]→ P(Jν,1),
cν,i : [Kν ]×Jν¯,1 × . . .×Jν¯,i−1 → P(Jν,i).
The stochastic matrix c : [K1]× [K2]→ P(J1 ×J2) is obtained by setting
c(j1,1, . . . , j1,I , j2,1, . . . , j2,I |k1, k2)
:= c1,1(j1,1|k1) c2,1(j2,1|k2) · · ·
· · · c1,I(j1,I |k1, j2,1, . . . , j2,I−1) c2,I(j2,I |k2, j1,1, . . . , j1,I−1).
We denote the J1- and J2-marginals of this stochastic matrix by c1 and c2,
so c1(j1,1, . . . , j1,I |k1, k2) is obtained by summing over j2,1, . . . , j2,I and c2 is
obtained analogously.
Now we define a wiretap MAC code with conferencing encoders. It consists
of a Willems conferencing stochastic matrix c : [K1]× [K2]→ P(J1 ×J2) as
above together with encoding stochastic matrices
G1 : [K1]×J2 → X
n,
G2 : [K2]×J1 → Y
n
and a decoding function
ϕ : T n → [K1]× [K2].
[K1] is the set of Alice1’s messages and [K2] is the set of Alice2’s messages. A
pair (k1, k2) ∈ [K1]× [K2] is encoded into the codeword pair (x,y) ∈ X
n ×Y n
with probability ∑
(j1,j2)∈J1×J2
c(j1, j2|k1, k2)G1(x|k1, j2)G2(y|k2, j1). (1)
In particular, conferencing generates common randomness. As both c1 and c2
may depend on both encoders’ messages, the codewords may as well depend on
both messages. Thus if conferencing were unrestricted, this would transform the
MAC into a single-user wiretap channel with input alphabet X ×Y . However,
Willems introduces a restriction in terms of the blocklength of the code which is
used for transmission. For conferencing under conferencing capacities C1, C2 ≥ 0,
he requires that for a blocklength-n code, |J1| and |J2| satisfy
1
n
log|Jν | ≤ Cν (ν = 1, 2). (2)
We also impose this constraint and define a wiretap MAC code with conferencing
capacities C1, C2 ≥ 0 to be a wiretap MAC code with conferencing encoders
satisfying (2).
Let a wiretap MAC code with conferencing encoders be given and letM1,M2
be independent random variables uniformly distributed on [K1] and [K2], re-
spectively. Let Xn, Y n, T n, Zn be random variables such that conditional on
(M1,M2), the distribution of (X
n, Y n) is given by (1) and such that
PTnZn|XnY nM1M2 = W
⊗n.
Then the average error of the code defined above equals
P[ϕ(T n) 6= (M1,M2)].
Definition 2.3. A rate pair (R1, R2) ∈ R
3
≥0 is achievable by the wiretap MAC
with conferencing encoders at conferencing capacities C1, C2 > 0 if for every
η > 0 and every ε ∈ (0, 1) and for n large there exists a wiretap MAC code with
conferencing capacities C1, C2 and blocklength n satisfying
1
n
logKν ≥ Rν − η (ν = 1, 2),
P[ϕ(T n) 6= (M1,M2)] ≤ ε,
I(Zn ∧M1M2) ≤ ε.
Remark 2.4. Here again, as in Remark 2.2, the average decoding error for any
decoder Eve might apply tends to 1 if the security criterion is satisfied.
3 Coding Theorems
3.1 For the Wiretap MAC with Common Message
Let HC ≥ 0 be the common randomness bound. The rate region whose achiev-
ability we are about to claim in Theorem 3.1 can be written as the closure of
the convex hull of the union of certain rate sets which are parametrized by the
elements of a subset ΠHC of the set Π which is defined as follows. Π contains
all probability distributions p of random vectors (U, V1, V2, X, Y, T, Z) living on
sets U × V1 × V2 ×X ×Y ×T ×Z , where U ,V1,V2 are finite subsets of the
integers and where p has the form
p = PU ⊗ PV1|U ⊗ PV2|U ⊗ PX|V1 ⊗ PY |V2 ⊗W.
Next we define ΠHC . There are four cases altogether, numbered Case 0 to
Case 3. Case 0 corresponds to HC = 0 and if HC > 0, then ΠHC has the form
ΠHC = Π
(1)
HC
∪ Π
(2)
HC
∪ Π
(3)
HC
, and each of these subsets corresponds to one of
these cases. The one condition all cases have in common is that I(Z ∧ V1V2) ≤
I(T ∧ V1V2).
Case 0: If HC = 0 define the set Π0 as the set of those p ∈ Π where V1
and V2 are independent of U (so we can omit U in this case and V1 and V2 are
independent) and where p satisfies the inequalities
I(Z ∧ V1) ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2), (3)
I(Z ∧ V2) ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1). (4)
For p ∈ Π0 define the set R(0)(p) to be the set of nonnegative triples (R0, R1, R2)
satisfying
R0 = 0,
R1 ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2)− I(Z ∧ V1)− [I(Z ∧ V2|V1)− I(T ∧ V2|V1)]+,
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1)− I(Z ∧ V2)− [I(Z ∧ V1|V2)− I(T ∧ V1|V2)]+,
R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2)− I(Z ∧ V1V2).
Case 1: Π
(1)
HC
is the set of those p ∈ Π which satisfy I(Z ∧ U) < HC and
I(Z ∧ V1|U) ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U), (5)
I(Z ∧ V2|U) ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U), (6)
I(Z ∧ V1V2|U) ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U) + I(T ∧ V2|V1U). (7)
Then we denote by R(1)(p) the set of nonnegative real triples (R0, R1, R2) sat-
isfying
R1 ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U)− I(Z ∧ V1|U)
− [I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)− I(T ∧ V2|V1U)]+,
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U)− I(Z ∧ V2|U)
− [I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)− I(T ∧ V1|V2U)]+,
R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2|U)− I(Z ∧ V1V2|U),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2)− I(Z ∧ V1V2).
Case 2: The conditions for p to be contained in Π
(2)
HC
cannot be phrased as
simply as for Π
(1)
HC
. Generally, if p ∈ Π
(2)
HC
then
min{I(Z ∧ V1U), I(Z ∧ V2U)} < HC ≤ I(Z ∧ V1V2).
This is sufficient if I(Z ∧ V1|V2U) = I(Z ∧ V2|V1U). If I(Z ∧ V1|V2U) > I(Z ∧
V2|V1U) then we additionally require that
α
(2)
0 := max
(
I(Z ∧ V1U)−HC
I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)− I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
, 1−
I(T ∧ V2|V1U)
I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
, 0
)
≤ α
(2)
1 := min
(
I(T ∧ V1|V2U)
I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)
,
I(T ∧ V1V2|U)− I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)− I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
, 1
)
whereas if I(Z ∧ V1|V2U) < I(Z ∧ V2|V1U) then we need
α
(2)
0 := max
(
1−
I(T ∧ V2|V1U)
I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
,
I(T ∧ V1V2|U)− I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)− I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
, 0
)
≤ α
(2)
1 := min
(
HC − I(Z ∧ V1U)
I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)− I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)
,
I(T ∧ V1|V2U)
I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)
, 1
)
.
In the case of equality, i.e. if I(Z ∧ V1|V2U) = I(Z ∧ V2|V1U), we define R(2)(p)
as
R1 ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U),
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2|U)− I(Z ∧ V1|V2U),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2)− I(Z ∧ V1V2).
If I(Z ∧ V1|V2U) > I(Z ∧ V2|V1U), we define R(2)(p) by
R1 ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U)− α
(2)
0 I(Z ∧ V1|V2U),
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U)− (1 − α
(2)
1 )I(Z ∧ V2|V1U),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2|U)− α
(2)
0 I(Z ∧ V1|V2U) (8)
− (1− α
(2)
0 )I(Z ∧ V2|V1U),
R1 +
I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U) (9)
+
(
I(T ∧ V1|U)
I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)
− 1
)
I(Z ∧ V2|V1U),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2)− I(Z ∧ V1V2).
The bound (8) on R1 +R2 can be reformulated as
R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2|U)− I(Z ∧ V1V2|U)
+min
{
HC − I(Z ∧ U), I(Z ∧ V1|U),
I(T ∧ V1|V2U)
(
I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)
− 1
)
+ I(Z ∧ V1|U)
}
,
and if I(Z ∧ V2|V1U) > 0, we can give the weighted sum bound (9) the almost
symmetric form
R1
I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)
+
R2
I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
≤
I(T ∧ V1|U)
I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)
+
I(T ∧ V2|V1U)
I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
− 1.
For the case that I(Z∧V1|V2U) < I(Z∧V2|V1U), we define R(2)(p) by exchanging
the roles of V1 and V2.
Case 3:We define Π
(3)
HC
to be the set of those p ∈ Π with I(Z ∧V1V2) < HC
and for such a p let R(3)(p) equal
R1 ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U),
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2|U),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2)− I(Z ∧ V1V2).
Theorem 3.1. For the common randomness bound HC = 0, the wiretap MAC
W with common message achieves the set
closure
(
conv
( ⋃
p∈Π0
R(0)(p)
))
. (10)
If HC > 0, then the closure of the convex hull of the set⋃
p∈Π
(1)
HC
R(1)(p) ∪
⋃
p∈Π
(2)
HC
R(2)(p) ∪
⋃
p∈Π
(3)
HC
R(3)(p)
is achievable.
Remark 3.2. Using the standard Carathe´odory-Fenchel technique, one can show
that one may without loss of generality assume |U | ≤ |X ||Y |+5. However, |V1|
and |V2| cannot be bounded in this way, as the application of the Carathe´odory-
Fenchel theorem does not preserve the conditional independence of V1 and V2.
Thus a characterization of the above achievable region involving sets with upper-
bounded cardinality is currently not available. As it would be important for an
efficient calculation of the achievable region, it still requires further consideration.
Remark 3.3. If no common randomness is available, then no common message
can be transmitted.
Remark 3.4. We have R(1)(p) ⊂ R(2)(p) ⊂ R(3)(p). This can be seen directly
at the beginning of the proof in Subsection 4.1 where we decompose the regions
R(ν)(p) for ν = 1, 2 into a union of simpler regions.
In particular, if HC is larger than the capacity of the single-sender discrete
memoryless channel We with input alphabet X × Y and output alphabet Z ,
then Π
(3)
HC
= Π and the achievable set equals
closure
(
conv
(⋃
p∈Π
R(3)(p)
))
.
In this case the maximal sum rate equals
C := max
p∈Π
(
I(T ∧ V1V2)− I(Z ∧ V1V2)
)
. (11)
This equals the secrecy capacity of the single-sender wiretap channel when Alice1
and Alice2 together are considered as one single sender. In order to see this, we
have to show that for any pair (V ′1 , V
′
2) of random variables on any Cartesian
product V1×V2 of finite sets one can find random variables (V1, V2, U) satisfying
PUV1V2 = PU⊗(PV1|U⊗PV2|U ) and PV1V2 = PV ′1V ′2 . Given such arbitrary (V
′
1 , V
′
2)
as above, just define U = V ′1 and PV1|U = the identity on V1 and PV2|U = PV ′2 |V ′1 .
Then a simple calculation shows that the above conditions are satisfied. Thus
(11) equals the secrecy capacity of the single-sender wiretap channel with Alice1
and Alice2 combined into a single sender. The remaining conditions on R1 and
R2 formulated in the definition of R(3)(p) are not concerned with We, they are
required by the non-wiretap MAC coding theorem applied to Wb.
3.2 For the Wiretap MAC with Conferencing Encoders
For conferencing capacities C1, C2 > 0, the achievable rate region is parametrized
by the members of ΠC1+C2 . We have Cases 1-3 from the common message part.
Case 1: For p ∈ Π
(1)
C1+C2
we define R(1)(p, C1, C2) by
R1 ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U)− I(Z ∧ V1|U)
−[I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)− I(T ∧ V2|V1U)]+ + C1 − [I(Z ∧ U)− C2]+,
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U)− I(Z ∧ V2|U)
−[I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)− I(T ∧ V1|V2U)]+ + C2 − [I(Z ∧ U)− C1]+,
R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(T ∧ V1V2|U) + C1 + C2, I(T ∧ V1V2))} − I(Z ∧ V1V2)).
Case 2: For p ∈ Π
(2)
C1+C2
, we set J
(α)
0 := αI(Z ∧ V2U) + (1− α)I(Z ∧ V1U).
For α ∈ [α
(2)
0 , α
(2)
1 ] define the set R
(2)
α (p, C1, C2) by
R1 ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U)− αI(Z ∧ V1|V2U) + C1 − [J
(α)
0 − C2]+,
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U)− (1− α)I(Z ∧ V2|V1U) + C2 − [J
(α)
0 − C1]+,
R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(T ∧ V1V2|U) + C1 + C2, I(T ∧ V1V2)} − I(Z ∧ V1V2).
Then we set
R(2)(p, C1, C2) :=
⋃
α
(2)
0 ≤α≤α
(2)
1
R(2)α (p, C1, C2).
Case 3: For p ∈ Π
(3)
C1+C2
we define R(3)(p, C1, C2) by
R1 ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U) + C1 − [I(Z ∧ V1V2)− C2]+,
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U) + C2 − [I(Z ∧ V1V2)− C1]+,
R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(T ∧ V1V2|U) + C1 + C2, I(T ∧ V1V2)} − I(Z ∧ V1V2).
Theorem 3.5. For the conferencing capacities C1, C2 > 0, the wiretap MAC
W with conferencing encoders achieves the closure of the convex hull of the set⋃
p∈Π
(1)
HC
R(1)(p, C1, C2) ∪
⋃
p∈Π
(2)
HC
R(2)(p, C1, C2) ∪
⋃
p∈Π
(3)
HC
R(3)(p, C1, C2).
Remark 3.6. Remark 3.2 applies here, too.
Remark 3.7. The stochastic conferencing protocols employed to achieve the sets
in Theorem 3.5 are non-iterative. That means that the c we use in the proof
have the form
c(v1, v2|k1, k2) = c1(v1|k1)c2(v2|k2).
Remark 3.8. If C1 = C2 = 0, then the maximal rate set whose achievability
we can show is (10). Conferencing only enlarges this set in the presence of a
wiretapper if it is used to establish common randomness between the encoders.
At least this is true for the achievable region we can show, it cannot be verified
in general as long as one does not have a converse. The reason is that confer-
encing generates a common message shared by Alice1 and Alice2. As noted in
Remark 3.3, a common message can only be kept secret if common randomness
is available. As the Alices do not have common randomness a priori, this also
has to be generated by conferencing, so the Willems conferencing protocol has
to be stochastic.
Remark 3.9. With the coding method we apply, conferencing may enable secure
transmission if this is not possible without. That means that there are wiretap
MACs where the achievable region without conferencing as derived in Theorem
3.1 only contains the rate pair (0, 0) whereas it contains non-trivial rate pairs
with C1, C2 > 0. See Section 6 for an example.
Remark 3.10. If C1, C2 are sufficiently large, then the maximal achievable sum
rate equals the secrecy capacity C of the single-sender wiretap channel with
input alphabet X ×Y and channel matrix W , see (11). In fact, this happens if
1) C1+C2 is strictly larger than the capacity of the single-sender discrete mem-
oryless channel We with input alphabet X × Y and output alphabet Z ,
2) C1 +C2 ≥ minp∈Π∗ I(T ∧U), where Π
∗ contains those p ∈ Π which achieve
C .
Condition 1) is sufficient to guarantee that C is achievable by an element of
Π
(3)
C1+C2
which then equalsΠ , see Remark 3.4. In particularΠ∗ is nonempty, and
2) ensures that the maximum overΠ of the sum rate bounds from R(3)(p, C1, C2)
equals C .
4 Proof of Theorem 3.1
4.1 Elementary Rate Regions
For Cases 0, 1 and 2 we first show the achievability of certain rate regions whose
union or convex combination then yields the achievable regions claimed in the
theorem.
For Case 0 and 1: We only consider Case 1, Case 0 is analogous. The consider-
ations hold for I(Z∧V1|U) < I(Z∧V1|V2U) which is equivalent to I(Z∧V2|U) <
I(Z ∧ V2|V1U). In the case of equality we can prove the achievability of R(p)
directly. Define
α
(1)
0 :=
[
I(T ∧ V2|V1U)− I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
I(Z ∧ V2|U)− I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
]
+
,
α
(1)
1 := min
{
I(T ∧ V1|V2U)− I(Z ∧ V1|U)
I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)− I(Z ∧ V1|U)
, 1
}
.
Note that conditions (5)-(7) are equivalent to α
(1)
0 ≤ α
(1)
1 . For α ∈ [α
(1)
0 , α
(1)
1 ]
we define a rate region R
(1)
α (p) by the bounds
R1 ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U)− αI(Z ∧ V1|V2U)− (1− α)I(Z ∧ V1|U),
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U)− αI(Z ∧ V2|U)− (1− α)I(Z ∧ V2|V1U),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2|U)− I(Z ∧ V1V2|U),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2)− I(Z ∧ V1V2).
Lemma 4.1. We have
R(1)(p) =
⋃
α
(1)
0 ≤α≤α
(1)
1
R(1)α (p).
Thus if R
(1)
α (p) is an achievable rate region for every α ∈ [α
(1)
0 , α
(1)
1 ], then
R(1)(p) is achievable.
For the proof we use the following lemma which is proved in the appendix.
Lemma 4.2. Assume that a1, a2, b1, b2, c, d, r1, r2, r12, r012 are nonnegative reals
satisfying
a1 > b1, a2 < b2, a1 + a2 = b1 + b2 = c, r1 + r2 ≥ r12.
Let 0 ≤ α0 ≤ α1 ≤ 1. For every α ∈ [α0, α1], let a three-dimensional convex
subset Kα of R3≥0 be defined by
R1 ≤ r1 − αa1 − (1− α)b1,
R2 ≤ r2 − αa2 − (1− α)b2,
R1 +R2 ≤ r12 − c,
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ r012 − d
and assume that Kα 6= ∅ for every α. Then⋃
α0≤α≤α1
Kα = K , (12)
where K is defined by
R1 ≤ r1 − α0a1 − (1− α0)b1, (13)
R2 ≤ r2 − α1a2 − (1− α1)b2, (14)
R1 +R2 ≤ r12 − c, (15)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ r012 − d. (16)
Proof (Lemma 4.1). The proof is a direct application of Lemma 4.2 by setting
r1 = I(T ∧ V1|V2U), r2 = I(T ∧ V2|V1U),
r12 = I(T ∧ V1V2|U), r012 = I(T ∧ V1V2),
a1 = I(Z ∧ V1|V2U), a2 = I(Z ∧ V2|U),
b1 = I(Z ∧ V1|U), b2 = I(Z ∧ V2|V1U),
α0 = α
(1)
0 , α1 = α
(1)
1 .
We just need to show that the bounds (13) and (14) coincide with those from
the definition of R(1)(p). This is easy for the case α
(1)
0 = 0 because in that
case we have I(T ∧ V2|V1U) ≥ I(Z ∧ V2|V1U) and the positive part in the
bound on R1 in the definition of R(1)(p) vanishes. Similarly α
(1)
1 = 1 implies
I(T ∧ V1|V2U) ≥ I(Z ∧ V1|V2U) and the positive part in the bound on R2 in
the definition of R(1)(p) vanishes. Now assume that α
(1)
0 > 0. This assumption
implies I(Z ∧ V2|V1U) > I(T ∧ V2|V1U). Thus we obtain for the equivalent of
(13)
I(T ∧ V1|V2U)− I(Z ∧ V1|U)
−
I(T ∧ V2|V1U)− I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
I(Z ∧ V2|U)− I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
(I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)− I(Z ∧ V1|U))
= I(T ∧ V1|V2U)− I(Z ∧ V1|U)
−
I(T ∧ V2|V1U)− I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
I(Z ∧ V2|U)− I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
(I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)− I(Z ∧ V2|U))
= I(T ∧ V1|V2U) + I(T ∧ V2|V1U)− I(Z ∧ V1V2|U)
= I(T ∧ V1|V2U)− I(Z ∧ V1|U)− [I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)− I(T ∧ V2|V1U)]+.
If α
(1)
1 < 1, we obtain the analog for the bound on R2. This shows with Lemma
4.2 that R(1)(p) can be represented as the union of the sets R
(1)
α (p) for α
(1)
0 ≤
α ≤ α
(1)
1 . ⊓⊔
For Case 2: Here we assume that I(Z ∧ V1|V2U) 6= I(Z ∧ V2|V1U) which is
equivalent to I(Z ∧V1U) 6= I(Z ∧V2U). In the case of equality, the achievability
of R(2)(p) can be shown directly. Define for α ∈ [α
(2)
0 , α
(2)
1 ] the rate set R
(2)
α (p)
by the conditions
R1 ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U)− αI(Z ∧ V1|V2U),
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U)− (1− α)I(Z ∧ V2|V1U),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2|U)− αI(Z ∧ V1|V2U)− (1 − α)I(Z ∧ V2|V1U),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2)− I(Z ∧ V1V2).
Lemma 4.3. We have that
R(2)(p) =
⋃
α
(2)
0 ≤α≤α
(2)
1
R(2)α (p).
In particular, if R
(2)
α (p) is achievable for every α ∈ [α
(2)
0 , α
(2)
1 ], then so is
R(2)(p).
Remark 4.4. The similarity between the rate regions for Case 1 and Case 2 be-
comes clear in these decompositions. The description for Case 2 is more complex
because α
(2)
0 and α
(2)
1 are defined through three minima/maxima. This is due to
the fact that the sum αI(Z ∧ V1|V2U) + (1 − α)I(Z ∧ V2|V1U) is not constant
in α. Hence the conditions for α
(2)
0 ≤ α
(2)
1 cannot be reformulated into simple
conditions on the corresponding p.
One obtains Lemma 4.3 from the next lemma by making the following re-
placements:
r1 = I(T ∧ V1|V2U), r2 = I(T ∧ V2|V1U),
r12 = I(T ∧ V1V2|U), r012 = I(T ∧ V1V2),
a = I(Z ∧ V1|V2U), b = I(Z ∧ V2|V1U),
c = I(Z ∧ V1V2),
α0 = α
(2)
0 , α1 = α
(2)
1 .
Lemma 4.5. Let r1, r2, r12, r012, a, b, c be nonnegative reals with max(r1, r2) ≤
r12 ≤ r1 + r2. Let α0, α1 ∈ [0, 1] be given such that for every α ∈ [α0, α1] the set
Kα defined by
R1 ≤ r1 − αa,
R2 ≤ r2 − (1− α)b,
R1 +R2 ≤ r12 − αa− (1 − α)b,
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ r012 − c
is nonempty. If a ≤ b, the convex hull of the union of these sets is given by the
set K which is characterized by
0 ≤ R1 ≤ r1 − α0a, (17)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ r2 − (1− α1)b, (18)
R1 +R2 ≤ r12 − α1a− (1 − α1)b, (19)
bR1 + aR2 ≤ r12a+ r1(b − a)− ab, (20)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ r012 − c. (21)
If a > b, the convex hull of the union of the sets Kα is given by analogous bounds
where a and b are exchanged in (20).
The proof of Lemma 4.5 can be found in the appendix.
4.2 How to Prove Secrecy
Proving secrecy using Chernoff-type concentration inequalities (see Subsection
4.3) is the core of Devetak’s approach to the wiretap channel [17]. Due to the
multi-user structure of the inputs of the wiretap MAC, we need several such
Chernoff-type inequalities basing on each other compared to the one used by De-
vetak (actually an application of the Ahlswede-Winter lemma). However, once
these are established, the way of obtaining secrecy is exactly the same as pre-
sented by Devetak. With the help of the inequalities one obtains a code with
stochastic encoding and a measure ϑ (not necessarily a probability measure!)
such that for all k0, k1, k2
‖PZn|M0=k0,M1=k1,M2=k2 − ϑ‖ ≤
ε
2
. (22)
Given this, we now derive an upper bound on I(Zn ∧M0M1M2), where the ran-
dom triple (M0,M1,M2) is uniformly distributed on the possible input message
triples and Zn represents the output received by Eve. Observe that
I(Zn ∧M0M1M2)
=
1
K0K1K2
∑
k0,k1,k2
(H(Zn)−H(Zn|M0 = k0,M1 = k1,M2 = k2)). (23)
By [16, Lemma 2.7], every summand on the right-hand side is upper-bounded
by εk0k1k2 log(|Z |
n/εk0k1k2) if
εk0k1k2 := ‖PZn − PZn|M0=k0,M1=k1,M2=k2‖ ≤
1
2
.
But due to (22),
‖PZn − PZn|M0=k0,M1=k1,M2=k2‖
≤ ‖PZn − ϑ‖+ ‖ϑ− PZn|M0=k0,M1=k1,M2=k2‖
≤
1
K0K1K2
∑
k˜0,k˜1,k˜2
‖PZn|M0=k˜0,M1=k˜1,M2=k˜2 − ϑ‖+
ε
2
≤ ε.
Thus if ε tends to zero exponentially in blocklength, then (23) is upper-bounded
by ε log(|Z |n/ε) which tends to zero in n.
4.3 Probabilistic Bounds for Secrecy
In this subsection we define the random variables from which we will build a
stochastic wiretap code in Subsection 4.5. For this family of random variables
we prove several Chernoff-type estimates which will serve to find a code satisfying
(22). For Case 3, two such estimates are sufficient, Case 0 and 2 require three
and Case 1 requires four. Within each case, one deals with the joint typicality
of the inputs at Alice1 and Alice2, and the other estimates base on each other.
This is due to the complex structure of our family of random variables. Still, all
the cases are nothing but a generalization of Devetak’s approach taken in [17].
For each case, we first show the probabilistic bounds in one paragraph and then
in another paragraph how to achieve (22) from those bounds.
Let p = PU ⊗ PX|U ⊗ PY |U ⊗W ∈ Π , i.e. p is the distribution of a random
vector (U,X, Y, T, Z). The auxiliary random variables V1 and V2 will be intro-
duced later in the usual way of prefixing a channel as a means of additional
randomization. Let δ > 0 and define for any n
PnU (u) :=
P⊗nU (u)
P⊗nU (T
n
U,δ)
(u ∈ T nU,δ),
PnX|U (x|u) :=
P⊗nX|U (x|u)
P⊗nX|U (T
n
X|U,δ(u)|u)
(x ∈ T nX|U,δ(u),u ∈ T
n
U,δ),
PnY |U (y|u) :=
P⊗nY |U (y|u)
P⊗nY |U (T
n
Y |U,δ(u)|u)
(y ∈ T nY |U,δ(u),u ∈ T
n
U,δ).
Let L0, L1, L2 be positive integers. We define L0 independent families of ran-
dom variables (U l0 ,Fl0) as follows. U
l0 is distributed according to PnU . We
let Fl0 := {X
l0l1 , Y l0l2 : l1 ∈ [L1], l2 ∈ [L2]} be a set of random variables
which are independent given U l0 and which satisfy X l0l1 ∼ PnX|U ( · |U
l0) and
Y l0l2 ∼ PnY |U ( · |U
l0). Finally we define
F :=
⋃
l0∈[L0]
(U l0 ,Fl0). (24)
Throughout the section, let a small ε > 0 be fixed. The core of the proofs of
all the lemmas of this subsection is the following Chernoff bound, see e.g. [4].
Lemma 4.6. Let b > 0 and 0 < ε < 1/2. For an independent sequence of
random variables Z1, . . . , ZL with values in [0, b] with µl := E[Xl] and with
µ := 1L
∑
l µl one has
P
[
1
L
L∑
l=1
Zl > (1 + ε)µ
]
≤ exp
(
−L ·
ε2µ
2b ln 2
)
and
P
[
1
L
L∑
l=1
Zl < (1− ε)µ
]
≤ exp
(
−L ·
ε2µ
2b ln 2
)
.
In order to obtain useful bounds in the following we collect here some well-
known estimates concerning typical sets, see e.g. [16, Lemma 17.8]. Let (A,B)
be a random pair on the finite Cartesian product A × B. Let ξ, ζ > 0. Then
there exists a c˜ = c˜(|A ||B|) > 0 such that for sufficiently large n
P⊗nB|A(T
n
B|A,ζ(a)
c|a) ≤ 2−nc˜ζ
2
. (25)
Further there is a τ = τ(PAB , ξ, ζ) with τ → 0 as ξ, ζ → 0 such that
P⊗nB|A(b|a) ≤ 2
−n(H(B|A)−τ) if a ∈ T nA,ξ,b ∈ T
n
B|A,ζ, (26)
and that for n sufficiently large,
|T nA,ξ| ≤ 2
n(H(A)+τ), (27)
|T nB|A,ζ(a)| ≤ 2
n(H(B|A)+τ) if a ∈ T nA,ξ. (28)
We set
c := c˜(|U ||X ||Y ||Z |),
this is the minimal c˜ we will need in the following.
Bounds for Case 0 and 1: Let L0, L1, L2 be arbitrary. Due to their conditional
independence, the X l0l1 and Y l0l2 cannot be required to be jointly conditionally
typical given U l0 . However, the next lemma shows that most of them are jointly
conditionally typical with high probability.
Lemma 4.7. For (l0, l2) ∈ [L0]× [L2], let the event A
(1)
∗ (l0, l2) be defined by
A
(1)
∗ (l0, l2)
:=
{
|{l1 ∈ [L1] : X
l0l1 ∈ T nX|Y U,δ(Y
l0l2 , U l0)}| ≥ (1 − ε)(1− 2 · 2−ncδ
2
)L1}.
Then
P[A
(1)
∗ (l0, l2)
c] ≤ exp
(
−L1 ·
ε2(1− 2 · 2−ncδ
2
)
2 ln 2
)
.
Proof. Let u ∈ T nU,δ and y ∈ T
n
Y |U,δ(u). We first condition on the event {Y
l0l2 =
y, U l0 = u}. Due to (25), we have
P[X11 /∈ T nX|Y U,δ(y,u)|Y
l0l2 = y, U1 = u]
=
1
P⊗nX|U (T
n
X|U,δ(u)|u)
∑
x∈Tn
X|U,δ
(u)\Tn
X|Y U,δ
(y,u)
P⊗nX|U (x|u)
≤
1
P⊗nX|U (T
n
X|U,δ(u)|u)
∑
x/∈Tn
X|Y U,δ
(y,u)
P⊗nX|Y U (x|y,u)
≤
2−ncδ
2
1− 2−ncδ2
.
In particular,
µ := P[X11 ∈ T nX|Y U,δ(y,u)|Y
11 = y, U1 = u] ≥ 1− 2 · 2−ncδ
2
.
Therefore
P[A
(1)
∗ (l0, l2)
c|Y l0l2 = y, U l0 = u]
≤ P
[∑
l1
1Tn
X|Y U,δ
(y,u)(X
l0l1) ≤ (1− ε)µL1
∣∣∣∣Y l0l2 = y, U l0 = u
]
,
which by Lemma 4.6 can be bounded by
exp
(
−L1 ·
ε2µ
2 ln 2
)
≤ exp
(
−L1 ·
ε2(1− 2 · 2−ncδ
2
)
2 ln 2
)
.
This completes the proof as this bound is independent of (y,u). ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.7 is not needed for a single sender. As we cannot guarantee the
joint conditional typicality of both senders’ inputs, we need to introduce an
explicit bound on the channel transition probabilities. This is done in the set
E
(1)
1 . Then we prove three lemmas each of which exploits one of the three types
of independence contained in F . Altogether these lemmas provide lower bounds
on L0, L1, L2 which if satisfied allow the construction of a wiretap code satisfying
(22). Let
E
(1)
1 (u,x,y) := {z ∈ T
n
Z|Y U,2|X |δ(y,u) :W
⊗n
e (z|x,y) ≤ 2
−n(H(Z|XY )−f2(δ))},
where f2(δ) = τ(PUXY Z , 3δ, δ) (see (26)). Let
ϑ(1)
uy
(z) := E[W⊗ne (z|X
11,y)1
E
(1)
1 (u,X
11,y)
(z)|U1 = u]
and for
F
(1)
1 (u,y) := {z ∈ T
n
Z|Y U,2|X |δ(y,u) : ϑ
(1)
uy
(z) ≥ ε|T nZ|Y U,2|X |δ(y,u)|
−1}
define
ϑˆ(1)
uy
:= ϑ(1)
uy
· 1
F
(1)
1 (u,y)
, E
(1)
2 (u,x,y) := E
(1)
1 (u,x,y) ∩ F
(1)
1 (u,y).
Lemma 4.8. For every z ∈ Z n and (l0, l2) ∈ [L0] × [L2], let A
(1)
1 (l0, l2, z) be
the event that
1
L1
∑
l1
W⊗ne (z|X
l0l1 , Y l0l2)1
E
(1)
2 (U
l0 ,Xl0l1 ,Y l0l2)
(z) ∈ [(1± ε)ϑˆ
(1)
Ul0Y l0l2
(z)].
Then
P[A
(1)
1 (l0, l2, z)
c] ≤ 2 exp
(
−L1 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧X|Y U)+f1(δ)+f2(δ))
2 ln 2
)
for f1(δ) = τ(PUY Z , 2δ, 2|X |δ) and n sufficiently large.
Proof. For u ∈ T nU,δ and y ∈ T
n
Y |U,δ(u) we condition on the event {Y
l0l2 =
y, U l0 = u}. The conditional expectation of the bounded conditionally i.i.d.
random variables
W⊗ne (z|X
l0l1 ,y)1
E
(1)
2 (u,X
l0l1 ,y)
(z) ≤ 2−n(H(Z|XY )−f2(δ)) (l1 ∈ [L1])
is ϑˆ
(1)
uy(z). We use Lemma 4.6, the definition of F
(1)
1 (u,y), and (28) to obtain for
n sufficiently large
P[A
(1)
1 (l0, l2, z)
c|Y l0l2 = y, U l0 = u]
≤ 2 exp
(
−L1 ·
ε2ϑˆ
(1)
uy(z)2n(H(Z|XY )−f2(δ))
2 ln 2
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−L1 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧X|Y U)+f1(δ)+f2(δ))
2 ln 2
)
.
This bound is uniform in u and y, so the proof is complete. ⊓⊔
For the next lemma, define
ϑ(1)
u
(z) := E[W⊗ne (z|X
11, Y 11)1
E
(1)
2 (u,X
11,Y 11)
(z)|U1 = u].
Further let
F
(1)
2 (u) := {z ∈ T
n
Z|U,3|Y ||X |δ(u) : ϑ
(1)
u
(z) ≥ ε|T nZ|U,3|Y ||X |δ(u)|
−1}
and
ϑˆ(1)
u
= ϑ(1)
u
· 1
F
(1)
2 (u)
, E
(1)
0 (u,x,y) := E
(1)
2 (u,x,y) ∩ F
(1)
2 (u,y).
Lemma 4.9. For every z ∈ Z n and l0 ∈ [L0], let A
(1)
2 (l0, z) be the event
1
L1L2
∑
l1l2
W⊗ne (z|X
l0l1 , Y l0l2)1
E
(1)
0 (U
l0 ,Xl0l1 ,Y l0l2 )
(z) ∈ [(1± 3ε)ϑˆ
(1)
Ul0
(z)].
Then for ε sufficiently small and n sufficiently large,
P[A
(1)
2 (l0, z)
c] ≤ 2|Y |n exp
(
−L1 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧X|Y U)+f1(δ)+f2(δ))
2 ln 2
)
+ 2 exp
(
−L2 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧Y |U)+f1(δ)+f4(δ))
4 ln 2
)
,
where f4(δ) = τ(PUZ , δ, 3|Y ||X |δ).
Proof. Let u ∈ T nU,δ. We define the set Bu ⊂ (T
n
X|U,δ(u))
L1 as
⋂
y∈Tn
Y |U,δ
(u)
{
(x1, . . . ,xL1) ∈ (T nX|U,δ(u))
L1 :
1
L1
∑
l1
W⊗ne (z|x
l0l1 ,y)1
E
(1)
0 (u,X
l0l1 ,y)
(z) ∈ [(1± ε)ϑˆ(1)
uy
(z)]
}
.
One has
P[A
(1)
2 (l0, z)
c|U l0 = u]
≤ P
[
{(X l01, . . . , X l0L1) /∈ Bu}|U
l0 = u
]
+
∑
(x1,...,xL1)∈Bu
P
[
A
(1)
2 (l0, z)
c|X l01 = x1, . . . , X l0L1 = xL1 , U l0 = u
]
·
· P[X l01 = x1, . . . , X l0L1 = xL1 |U l0 = u
]
.
From the proof of Lemma 4.8 it follows that
P
[
{(X l01, . . . , X l0L1) /∈ Bu}|U
l0 = u
]
≤ 2|Y |n exp
(
−L1 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧X|Y U)+f1(δ)+f2(δ))
2 ln 2
)
, (29)
which gives a bound independent of u. Now let (x1, . . . ,xL1) ∈ Bu. By (25) and
(26),
ϑˆ(1)
uy
(z) = E[W⊗ne (z|X
11,y)1
E
(1)
2 (u,X
11,y)
(z)|U1 = u]
≤ E[W⊗ne (z|X
11,y)|U1 = u]
≤
1
P⊗nX|U (T
n
X|U,δ(u)|u)
(PZ|Y U )
⊗n(z|y,u)
≤ (1− 2−ncδ
2
)−12−n(H(Z|Y U)−f1(δ)).
Hence the random variables
W˜ (1)
uz
(l0, l2) :=
1
L1
∑
l1
W⊗ne (z|x
l1 , Y l0l2)1
E
(1)
0 (u,x
l1 ,Y l0l2 )
(z) (l2 ∈ [L2]),
which are independent conditional on {U l0 = u}, are upper-bounded by
(1 + ε)
(1 − 2−ncδ2)
· 2−n(H(Z|Y U)−f1(δ)).
For their conditional expectation we have
µl0l2 := E[W˜
(1)
uz
(l0, l2)|U
l0 = u]
∈ [(1± ε)E[ϑˆ
(1)
uY l0l2
(z)|U1 = u]] = [(1 ± ε)ϑˆ(1)
u
(z)].
Thus their arithmetic mean µ¯ = (1/L2)
∑
l2
µl0l2 must also be contained in
[(1± ε)ϑˆ
(1)
u (z)]. Applying Lemma 4.6, we conclude
P
[
A
(1)
2 (l0, z)
c|X l01 = x1, . . . , X l0L1 = xL1 , U l0 = u
]
= P
[
1
L2
∑
l2
W˜ (1)
uz
(l0, l2) /∈ [(1± 3ε)ϑˆ
(1)
u
(z)]
∣∣∣∣U l0 = u
]
≤ P
[
1
L2
∑
l2
W˜ (1)
uz
(l0, l2) /∈ [(1± ε)µ¯]
∣∣∣∣U l0 = u
]
≤ 2 exp
(
−L2 ·
ε2(1− 2−ncδ
2
)2n(H(Z|Y U)−f1(δ))(1 − ε)ϑˆ
(1)
u (z)
2(1 + ε) ln 2
)
.
Due to the definition of F
(1)
2 (u) and to (28), this is smaller than
2 exp
(
−L2 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧Y |U)+f1(δ)+f4(δ))
4 ln 2
)
(30)
if ε is sufficiently small and n is sufficiently large, giving a bound independent
of u and x1, . . . ,xL1 . Adding the bounds (29) and (30) concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
The next lemma is only needed in Case 1. Let A
(1)
2 (z) := A
(1)
2 (1, z) ∩ . . . ∩
A
(1)
2 (L0, z). For every z, we then define a new probability measure by Pˆ
(1)
z :=
P[·|A
(1)
2 (z)]. With ϑ
(1)(z) := Eˆ
(1)
z [ϑˆ
(1)
U1 (z)] define
F
(1)
0 := {z ∈ T
n
Z,4|Y ||X ||U |δ : ϑ
(1)(z) ≥ |T nZ,4|Y ||X ||U |δ|
−1}
and ϑˆ(1) := ϑ(1) · 1
F
(1)
0
.
Lemma 4.10. Let z ∈ F
(1)
0 and let A
(1)
0 (z) be the event that
1
L0L1L2
∑
l0,l1,l2
W⊗ne (z|X
l0l1 , Y l0l2)1
E
(1)
0 (U
l0 ,Xl0l1 ,Y l0l2 )
(z) ∈ [(1 ± 5ε)ϑˆ(1)(z)].
Then for f6(δ) = τ(PZ , 4|Y ||X ||U |δ, δ), sufficiently small ε and n sufficiently
large,
P[A
(1)
0 (z)
c]
≤ 2L0|Y |
n exp
(
−L1 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧X|Y U)+f1(δ)+f2(δ))
2 ln 2
)
+2L0 exp
(
−L2 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧Y |U)+f1(δ)+f4(δ))
4 ln 2
)
+2 exp
(
−L0 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧U)+f4(δ)+f6(δ))
4 ln 2
)
.
Proof. We have
P[A
(1)
0 (z)
c] ≤ Pˆ(1)
z
[A
(1)
0 (z)
c] + P[A
(1)
2 (z)
c]. (31)
By Lemma 4.9, for ε sufficiently small and n sufficiently large,
P[A
(1)
2 (z)
c] ≤ 2L0|Y |
n exp
(
−L1 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧X|Y U)+f1(δ)+f2(δ))
2 ln 2
)
+2L0 exp
(
−L2 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧Y |U)+f1(δ)+f4(δ))
4 ln 2
)
.
(32)
In order to bound Pˆ
(1)
z [A
(1)
0 (z)
c], note that the sets A
(1)
2 (1, z), . . . , A
(1)
2 (L0, z) are
independent with respect to P. Thus under Pˆ
(1)
z , the random variables
W˜ (1)
z
(l0) :=
1
L1L2
∑
l1,l2
W⊗ne (z|X
l0l1 , Y l0l2)1
E
(1)
0 (U
l0 ,Xl0l1 ,Y l0l2)
(z) (l0 ∈ [L0])
retain their independence and are upper-bounded by
(1 + 3ε) max
u∈Tn
U,δ
ϑˆ(1)
u
(z).
We can further bound this last term as follows: for u ∈ T nU,δ, applying (25) and
(26),
ϑˆ(1)
u
(z) = E[W⊗ne (z|X
11, Y 11)1
E
(1)
0 (u,X
11,Y 11)
(z)|U1 = u]
≤ E[W⊗ne (z|X
11, Y 11)|U1 = u]
≤
1
P⊗n1 (T
n
X|U,δ(u)|u)P
⊗n
2 (T
n
Y |U,δ(u)|u)
P⊗nZ|U (z|u)
≤ (1− 2−nc1δ
2
)−22−n(H(Z|U)−f4(δ)).
Observing that Eˆ
(1)
z [W˜
(1)
z (1)] ∈ [(1 ± 3ε)ϑˆ(1)(z)] and applying Lemma 4.6 and
(28) in the usual way yields
Pˆ
(1)
z
[A
(1)
0 (z)
c] ≤ 2 exp
(
−L0 ·
ε2(1− 2−ncδ
2
)2 2n(H(Z|U)−f4(δ))(1− 3ε) ϑˆ(1)(z)
2(1 + 3ε) ln 2
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−L0 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧U)+f4(δ)+f6(δ))
4 ln 2
)
if ε is sufficiently small and n sufficiently large. Inserting this and (32) in (31)
completes the proof. ⊓⊔
We finally note that results analogous to Lemma 4.7-4.10 hold where the roles
of X and Y are exchanged. We denote the corresponding events by A
(1)
∗ (l0, l2)
′
and A
(1)
1 (l0, l2, z)
′, A
(1)
2 (l0, z)
′, A
(1)
0 (z)
′.
Secrecy for Case 0 and 1: The following lemma links the above probabilistic
bounds to secrecy. In the next subsection, roughly speaking, we will associate
a family F to every message triple (k0, k1, k2). If L0, L1, L2 are large enough,
the bounds of Lemma 4.11 are satisfied for every such F with high probability.
Hence there is a joint realization of the F such that the statement of the lemma
is satisfied for every message triple. By an appropriate choice of random code
one then obtains (22).
Lemma 4.11. Denote by p(1) the bound on P[A
(1)
2 (l0, z)
c] derived in Lemma
4.9. Let {ul0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0l2 : (l0, l1, l2) ∈ [L0] × [L1] × [L2]} be a realization of F
satisfying the conditions of
⋂
l0,l2
A
(1)
∗ (l0, l2), (33)
⋂
l0,l2
⋂
z∈Z n
A
(1)
1 (l0, l2, z), (34)
⋂
l0
⋂
z∈Z n
A
(1)
2 (l0, z), (35)
⋂
z∈F
(1)
0
A
(1)
0 (z). (36)
Then
‖ϑˆ(1) −
1
L0L1L2
∑
l0,l1,l2
W⊗ne (·|x
l0l1 ,yl0l2)‖ ≤ 20ε+ 9 · 2−ncδ
2
+ L0|Z |
np(1).
The same inequality is true if we require conditions (33′)-(36′) which contain the
primed equivalents of (33)-(36) defined at the end of the previous paragraph. If
L0 = 1, then (36) and (36
′) do not have to hold.
We now prove the above lemma. We have
‖ϑˆ(1) −
1
L0L1L2
∑
l0,l1,l2
W⊗ne (·|x
l0l1 ,yl0l2)‖
≤ ‖ϑˆ(1) −
1
L0L1L2
∑
l0,l1,l2
W⊗ne (·|x
l0l1 ,yl0l2)1
E
(1)
0 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0l2 )
1
F
(1)
0
‖ (37)
+ ‖
1
L0L1L2
∑
l0,l1,l2
W⊗ne (·|x
l0l1 ,yl0l2)1
E
(1)
0 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0l2 )
(1− 1
F
(1)
0
)‖ (38)
+ ‖
1
L0L1L2
∑
l0,l1,l2
W⊗ne (·|x
l0l1 ,yl0l2)1
E
(1)
2 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0l2 )
(1− 1
F
(1)
2 (u
l0)
)‖ (39)
+ ‖
1
L0L1L2
∑
l0,l1,l2
W⊗ne (·|x
l0l1 ,yl0l2)1
E
(1)
1 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0l2 )
(1− 1
F
(1)
1 (u
l0 ,yl0l2 )
)‖
(40)
+ ‖
1
L0L1L2
∑
l0,l1,l2
W⊗ne (·|x
l0l1 ,yl0l2)(1 − 1
E
(1)
1 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0l2)
)‖. (41)
Due to (36), we know that (37) ≤ 5ε.
Next we consider (40). Due to (34) we have
(40)
≤ 1−
1
L0L1L2
∑
l0,l1,l2
W⊗ne (E
(1)
2 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0l2)|xl0l1 ,yl0l2)
≤ 1−
1− ε
L0L2
∑
l0,l2
ϑˆ
(1)
ul0yl0l2
(Z n)
(we defined the general measure of a set in the notation section at the beginning
of the paper). The support of ϑ
(1)
u
l0yl0l2
is contained in T nZ|Y U,2|X |δ(y
l0l2 ,ul0), so
by the definition of F
(1)
1 (u
l0 ,yl0l2) we obtain
ϑˆ
(1)
u
l0yl0l2
(Z n) ≥ ϑ
(1)
u
l0yl0l2
(Z n)− ε. (42)
Lemma 4.12. If u ∈ T nU,δ and y ∈ T
n
Y |U,δ(u), then
ϑ(1)
uy
(Z n) ≥ 1− 2 · 2−ncδ
2
.
Proof. First of all note that
ϑ(1)
uy
(Z n)
= E[W⊗ne (E
(1)
1 (u, X
11,y)|X11,y)|U1 = u]
≥ E[W⊗ne (E
(1)
1 (u, X
11,y)|X11,y);X11 ∈ T nX|Y U,δ(y,u)|U
1 = u]. (43)
Now we claim that for x ∈ T nX|Y U,δ(y,u)
T nZ|YXU,δ(y,x,u) ⊂ T
n
Z|Y U,2|X |δ(y,u). (44)
To verify this, let (z, y, u) ∈ Z × Y ×U and z ∈ T nZ|YXU,δ(y,x,u). Then∣∣∣∣ 1nN(z, y, u|z,y,u)− PZ|Y U (z|y, u) 1nN(y, u|y,u)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
x
∣∣∣∣ 1nN(z, y, x, u|z,y,x,u)−W (z|x, y) 1nN(y, x, u|y,x,u)
∣∣∣∣
+
∑
x
W (z|x, y)
∣∣∣∣ 1nN(y, x, u|y,x,u)− PX|Y U (x|y, u) 1nN(y, u|y,u)
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2|X |δ.
This proves (44). Due to the choice of f2(δ) and to (26), we thus see that
T nZ|YXU,δ(y,x,u) is contained in E
(1)
1 (u,x,y) for x ∈ T
n
X|Y U,δ(y,u), and we
have that (43) is lower-bounded by
E[W⊗ne (T
n
Z|YXU,δ(y, X
11,u)|X11,y);X11 ∈ T nX|Y U,δ(y,u)|U
1 = u]. (45)
Further, as in the proof of Lemma 4.7 one sees that
P[X11 ∈ T nX|Y U,δ(y,u)|U
1 = u] ≥ 1−
2−ncδ
2
1− 2−ncδ2
. (46)
Due to (46) and (25), we can lower-bound (45) for sufficiently large n by
(1− 2−ncδ
2
) ·
(
1−
2−ncδ
2
1− 2−ncδ2
)
≥ 1− 2 · 2−ncδ
2
,
which proves Lemma 4.12. ⊓⊔
Using (42) and Lemma 4.12 we can conclude that
(40) ≤ 2(ε+ 2−ncδ
2
).
One starts similarly for (39). We have by (35)
(39) ≤ 1−
1
L0L1L2
∑
l0,l1,l2
W⊗ne (E
(1)
0 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0l2)|xl0l1 ,yl0l2)
≤ 1−
(1 − 3ε)
L0
∑
l0
ϑˆ
(1)
u
l0
(Z n).
As the support of ϑ
(1)
u
l0
is contained in T nZ|U,3|Y ||X |δ(u
l0), we can lower-bound
ϑˆ
(1)
ul0
(Z n) by ϑ
(1)
ul0
(Z n)− ε. Using (42) and Lemma 4.12, we have
ϑ
(1)
u
l0
(Z n) = E[ϑˆ
(1)
u
l0Y 11
(Z n)|U1 = ul0 ] ≥ 1− 2 · 2−ncδ
2
− ε, (47)
so we conclude
(39) ≤ 5ε+ 2 · 2−ncδ
2
.
For (38), one has by (36)
(38) ≤ 1−
1
L0L1L2
∑
l0,l1,l2
W⊗ne (E
(1)
0 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0l2) ∩ F
(1)
0 |x
l0l1 ,yl0l2)
≤ 1− (1 − 5ε)ϑˆ(1)(F
(1)
0 ).
It remains to lower-bound ϑˆ(1)(F
(1)
0 ). Observe that the support of ϑ
(1) is re-
stricted to T nZ,4|Y ||X ||U |δ, so due to the definition of F
(1)
0 , one has ϑˆ
(1)(F
(1)
0 ) =
ϑ(1)(F
(1)
0 ) ≥ ϑ
(1)(Z n)− ε. Further,
ϑ(1)(Z n) =
∑
z∈Z n
Eˆ
(1)
z
[θˆ
(1)
U1 (z)]
≥ E[θ
(1)
U1 (Z
n)]−
∑
z∈Z n
P[A
(1)
2 (z)
c]
= E[θ
(1)
U1 (Z
n)]− L0|Z |
np(1).
In (47), the integrand of E[θ
(1)
U1 (Z
n)] was lower-bounded by 1 − 2 · 2−ncδ
2
− ε.
We conclude
(38) ≤ 7ε+ 2 · 2−ncδ
2
+ L0|Z |
np(1).
Finally, we use condition (33) to bound (41). We have
(41) (48)
=
1
L0L1L2
∑
l0,l1,l2
W⊗ne (E
(1)
1 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0l2)c|xl0l1 ,yl0l2)
=
1
L0L2
∑
l0,l2
(
1
L1
∑
l1:xl0l1∈TnX|Y U,δ(y
l0l2 ,ul0)
W⊗ne (E
(1)
1 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0l2)c|xl0l1 ,yl0l2) (49)
+
1
L1
∑
l1:xl0l1 /∈TnX|Y U,δ(y
l0l2 ,ul0)
W⊗ne (E
(1)
1 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0l2)c|xl0l1 ,yl0l2)
)
. (50)
For every (l0, l2), we use T
n
Z|YXU,δ(y,x,u) ⊂ E
(1)
1 (u,x,y) for (u,x,y) ∈ T
n
U,δ ×
T nY |U,δ(u)× T
n
X|Y U,δ(y,u) as shown in the proof of Lemma 4.12 to upper-bound
the term in (49) by 2−ncδ
2
. For (50), we know from assumption (33) that it is
at most 1− (1− ε)(1− 2 · 2−ncδ
2
). Thus
(41) ≤ 2−ncδ
2
+ (1− ε)(1 − 2 · 2−ncδ
2
) ≤ ε+ 3 · 2−ncδ
2
.
Collecting the bounds on (37)-(41), we obtain a total upper bound of
20eps+ 9 · 2−ncδ
2
+ L0|Z |
np(1).
This finishes the proof of Lemma 4.11.
Bounds for Case 2: Now we specialize to the case that L2 = 1, but L0 and L1
arbitrary. This reduces the number of Chernoff-type estimates needed by one.
Lemma 4.8 carries over, Lemma 4.9 is not needed, but Lemma 4.10 changes.
We write Y l01 =: Y l0 . The definitions of E
(1)
1 (u,x,y), F
(1)
1 (u,y) and ϑ
(1)
uy carry
over to this case, we just call them E
(2)
1 (u,x,y), F
(2)
1 (u,y) and ϑ
(2)
uy . Further we
define
E
(2)
0 (u,x,y) := E
(2)
1 (u,x,y) ∩ F
(2)
1 (u,y).
For every l0, let A
(2)
1 (l0, z) := A
(1)
1 (l0, 1, z) and we set A
(2)
1 (z) := A
(2)
1 (1, z) ∩
. . . ∩ A
(2)
1 (L0, z). We define for every z a new probability measure by Pˆ
(2)
z :=
P[·|A
(2)
1 (z)]. Let
ϑ(2)(z) := Eˆ(2)
z
[ϑˆ
(2)
U1Y 1(z)].
Further let
F
(2)
0 := {z ∈ T
n
Z,4|Y ||X ||U |δ : ϑ
(2)(z) ≥ ε|T nZ,δ|
−1}
and
ϑˆ(2) = ϑ(2) · 1
F
(2)
0
.
Lemma 4.13. Let z ∈ F
(2)
0 . Let A
(2)
0 (z) be the event
1
L0L1
∑
l0,l1
W⊗ne (z|X
l0l1 , Y l0)1
E
(2)
0 (U
l0 ,Xl0l1 ,Y l0)
(z) ∈ [(1± 3ε)ϑˆ(2)(z)].
Then for ε sufficiently small and n sufficiently large,
P[A
(2)
0 (z)
c] ≤ 2L0 exp
(
−L1 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧X|Y U)+f1(δ)+f2(δ))
2 ln 2
)
+ 2 exp
(
−L0 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧Y U)+f1(δ)+f6(δ))
4 ln 2
)
.
Proof. We have
P[A
(2)
0 (z)
c] ≤ Pˆ(2)
z
[A
(2)
0 (z)
c] + P[A
(2)
1 (z)
c]. (51)
By Lemma 4.8, we know that
P[A
(2)
1 (z)
c] ≤ 2L0 exp
(
−L1 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧X|Y U)+f1(δ)+f2(δ))
2 ln 2
)
. (52)
In order to bound P
(2)
z [A
(2)
0 (z)], note that the sets A
(2)
1 (1, z), . . . , A
(2)
1 (L0, z) are
independent with respect to P. Thus under Pˆ
(2)
z , the random variables
W˜ (2)
z
(l0) :=
1
L1
∑
l1
W⊗ne (z|X
l0l1 , Y l0)1
E
(2)
0 (U
l0 ,Xl0l1 ,Y l0 )
(z) (l0 ∈ [L0])
retain their independence and are upper-bounded by
(1 + ε) max
u∈Tn
U,δ
max
y∈Tn
Y |U,δ
(u)
ϑˆ(2)
uy
(z).
We can further bound this last term as follows: for u ∈ T nU,δ and y ∈ T
n
Y |U,δ(u)
one obtains by (25) and (26)
ϑˆ(2)
uy
(z) ≤ E[W⊗ne (z|X
11,y)|U l0 = u]
≤
1
1− 2−ncδ2
P⊗nZ|Y U (z|y,u)
≤
1
1− 2−ncδ2
2−n(H(Z|Y U)−f1(δ)).
Observing that Eˆz[W˜
(2)
z (1)] ∈ [(1 ± ε)ϑˆ(2)(z)] and applying Lemma 4.6 in the
usual way yields
Pˆz[A
(2)
0 (z)] ≤ 2 exp
(
−L0 ·
ε2(1− 2−ncδ
2
)2n(H(Z|Y U)−f1(δ))(1 − ε)ϑˆ(2)(z)
2(1 + ε) ln 2
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−L0 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧Y U)+f1(δ)+f6(δ))
4 ln 2
)
if ε is sufficiently small and n sufficiently large. Inserting this and (52) in (51)
completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Again we note that a result analogous to Lemma 4.13 holds where the roles
of X and Y are exchanged. Setting A
(2)
∗ (l0) := A
(1)
∗ (l0, 1), we denote the events
corresponding to such an exchange by A
(2)
∗ (l0)
′ and A
(2)
1 (l0, z)
′, A
(2)
0 (z)
′.
Secrecy for Case 2:
Lemma 4.14. Denote by p(2) the bound on P[A
(2)
1 (l0, z)
c] derived in Lemma
4.8. Let {ul0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0 : (l0, l1, l2) ∈ [L0] × [L1] × [L2]} be a realization of F
satisfying the conditions of ⋂
l0
A
(2)
∗ (l0), (53)
⋂
l0
⋂
z∈Z n
A
(2)
1 (l0, z), (54)
⋂
z∈F
(2)
0
A
(2)
0 (z). (55)
Then
‖ϑˆ(2) −
1
L0L1
∑
l0,l1
W⊗ne (·|x
l0l1 ,yl0)‖ ≤ 9ε+ 7 · 2−ncδ
2
+ L0|Z |
np(2).
The same inequality is true if we require conditions (53′)-(55′) which contain the
primed equivalents of (53)-(55) defined at the end of the previous paragraph.
We use this subsection to prove the above lemma. We have
‖ϑˆ(2) −
1
L0L1
∑
l0,l1
W⊗ne (·|x
l0l1 ,yl0)‖
≤ ‖ϑˆ(2) −
1
L0L1
∑
l0,l1
W⊗ne (·|x
l0l1 ,yl0 )1
E
(2)
0 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0)
1
F
(2)
0
‖ (56)
+ ‖
1
L0L1
∑
l0,l1
W⊗ne (·|x
l0l1 ,yl0 )1
E
(2)
0 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0)
(1− 1
F
(2)
0
)‖ (57)
+ ‖
1
L0L1
∑
l0,l1
W⊗ne (·|x
l0l1 ,yl0 )1
E
(2)
1 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0)
(1− 1
F
(2)
1 (u
l0 ,yl0)
)‖ (58)
+ ‖
1
L0L1
∑
l0,l1
W⊗ne (·|x
l0l1 ,yl0 )(1− 1
E
(2)
1 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0)
)‖. (59)
Due to (55), we know that (56) ≤ ε.
Next we consider (58). Due to (54), we have
(58) ≤ 1−
1
L0L1
∑
l0,l1
W⊗ne (E
(2)
0 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0)|xl0l1 ,yl0 )
≤ 1−
1− ε
L0
∑
l0
ϑˆ
(2)
u
l0yl0
(Z n).
As for Case 3, one lower-bounds ϑˆ
(2)
u
l0yl0
(Z n) ≥ ϑ
(2)
u
l0yl0
(Z n)−ε by 1−2·2−ncδ
2
−
ε. Thus we can conclude that
(58) ≤ 2(ε+ 2−ncδ
2
).
For (57), we have by (54)
(57) ≤ 1−
1
L0L1
∑
l0,l1
W⊗ne (E
(2)
0 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0 ) ∩ F
(2)
0 |x
l0l1 ,yl0)
≤ 1− (1− 3ε)ϑˆ(2)(F
(2)
0 ).
It remains to lower-bound ϑˆ(2)(F
(2)
0 ) ≥ ϑ
(2)(Z n)− ε. As in the lower bound on
θ(1)(Z n) above, one obtains the bound
ϑ(2)(Z n) ≥ 1− 2 · 2−ncδ
2
− ε.
Thus we conclude
(57) ≤ 5ε+ 2 · 2−ncδ
2
.
Finally, we use condition (53) to bound (59). We have
(59) =
1
L0L1
∑
l0,l1
W⊗ne (E
(2)
1 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0)|xl0l1 ,yl0)
=
1
L0
∑
l0
(
1
L1
∑
l1:xl0l1∈TnX|Y U,δ(y
l0 ,ul0)
W⊗ne (E
(2)
1 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0)|xl0l1 ,yl0) (60)
+
1
L1
∑
l1:xl0l1 /∈TnX|Y U,δ(y
l0 ,ul0)
W⊗ne (E
(2)
1 (u
l0 ,xl0l1 ,yl0)|xl0l1 ,yl0)
)
. (61)
For every l0, the summand appearing in (60) can be upper-bounded by 2
−ncδ2 .
By assumption (53), (61) is upper-bounded by 1− (1− ε)(1− 2 · 2−ncδ
2
). Thus
(59) ≤ ε+ 3 · 2−ncδ
2
.
Collecting the bounds for (56)-(59), we obtain a total upper bound of
9ε+ 7 · 2−ncδ
2
+ L0|Z |
np(2).
This finishes the proof of Lemma 4.14.
Bounds for Case 3: Now we treat the case L1 = L2 = 1. Lemma 4.15 is the
analog of Lemma 4.7, the proofs are analogous.
Lemma 4.15. Let the event A
(3)
∗ be defined by
A
(3)
∗ :=
{
|{l0 ∈ [L0] : X
l0 ∈ T nX|Y U,δ(Y
l0 , U l0)}| ≥ (1−ε)(1−2·2−nc1δ
2
)L0}.
Then
P[(A
(3)
∗ )
c] ≤ exp
(
−L0 ·
ε2(1 − 2 · 2−nc1δ
2
)
2 ln 2
)
.
Let
E(3)(x,y) := {z ∈ T nZ,4|Y ||X ||U |δ : W
⊗n
e (z|x,y) ≤ 2
−n(H(Z|XY )−f2(δ))},
where f2(δ) = τ(PXY Z , 3δ, δ). Let
ϑ(3)(z) := E[W⊗ne (z|X
1, Y 1)1E1(X1,Y 1)(z)]
and for
F (3) := {z ∈ T nZ,4|Y ||X ||U |δ : ϑ(z) ≥ ε|T
n
Z,δ|
−1}
define the measure
ϑˆ(3) := ϑˆ(3) · 1F (3) .
Lemma 4.16. Let z ∈ F (3). Let A(3)(z) be the event that
1
L0
∑
l0
W⊗ne (z|X
l0 , Y l0)1E(3)(Xl0 ,Y l0)(z) ∈ [(1± ε)ϑˆ
(3)(z)].
Then for f1(δ) = τ(PUY Z , 4|Y ||X ||U |δ, δ),
P[A(3)(z)c] ≤ 2 exp
(
−L0 ·
ε32−n(I(Z∧XY )+f1(δ)+f2(δ))
2 ln 2
)
.
The proof of this lemma is analogous to that of Lemma 4.8.
Secrecy for Case 3:
Lemma 4.17. Let {(ul0 ,xl0 ,yl0)} be a realization of F satisfying the condi-
tions of
A
(3)
∗ , (62)⋂
z∈F (3)
A(3)(z). (63)
Then for sufficiently large n,
‖ϑˆ(3) −
1
L0
∑
l0
W⊗ne (·|x
l0 ,yl0)‖ ≤ 4ε+ 5 · 2−ncδ
2
. (64)
We use this subsection to prove the above lemma. We have
‖ϑˆ(3) −
1
L0
∑
l0
W⊗ne (·|x
l0 ,yl0)‖
≤ ‖ϑˆ(3) −
1
L0
∑
l0
W⊗ne (·|x
l0 ,yl0)1E(3)(xl0 ,yl0)1F (3)‖ (65)
+ ‖
1
L0
∑
l0
W⊗ne (·|x
l0 ,yl0)1E(3)(xl0 ,yl0)(1− 1F (3))‖ (66)
+ ‖
1
L0
∑
l0
W⊗ne (·|x
l0 ,yl0)(1 − 1E(3)(xl0 ,yl0))‖. (67)
Due to (63) we have (65) ≤ ε.
Next we bound (66). Again using (63),
(66) ≤ 1−
1
L0
∑
l0
W⊗ne (E
(3)(xl0 ,yl0) ∩ F (3)|xl0 ,yl0)
≤ 1− (1− ε)ϑˆ(3)(F (3)). (68)
As in Case 1 and 2, ϑˆ(3)(F (3)) can be lower-bounded by 1− 2 · 2−ncδ
2
− ε, so
(66) ≤ 1− (1− ε)(1− 2 · 2−ncδ
2
− ε) ≤ 2(ε+ 2−ncδ
2
).
Finally, the third term (67) equals
1
L0
∑
l0
W⊗ne (E
(3)(xl0 ,yl0 )c|xl0 ,yl0)
=
1
L0
∑
l0:xl0∈TX|Y U,δ(y
l0 ,ul0)
W⊗ne (E
(3)(xl0 ,yl0)c|xl0 ,yl0 ) (69)
+
1
L0
∑
l0:xl0 /∈TX|Y U,δ(y
l0 ,ul0)
W⊗ne (E
(3)(xl0 ,yl0)c|xl0 ,yl0). (70)
and is lower-bounded by
(67) ≤ 2−ncδ
2
+ (1− ε)(1 − 2 · 2−ncδ
2
) ≤ ε+ 3 · 2−ncδ
2
.
Combining the above bounds, we can conclude that
(65) + (66) + (67) ≤ 4ε+ 5 · 2−ncδ
2
,
which completes the proof of Lemma 4.17.
4.4 Random Coding for the Non-Wiretap MAC with Common
Message
Assume we are given another family of random variables
F ′ :=
⋃
l0∈[L0]
(U l
′
0 ,F ′l′0)
with F ′l′0
= {X l
′
0l
′
1 , Y l
′
0l
′
2 : l′1, l
′
2 ∈ [L
′
1]×[L
′
2]} for other positive integers L
′
0, L
′
1, L
′
2
with blocklength n′ which is independent of F , but which has the same structure
as F and whose distribution is defined according to the same p as F . Define
the rate set R˜(p) by the bounds
R˜1 ≤ I(T ∧X |Y U),
R˜2 ≤ I(T ∧ Y |XU),
R˜1 + R˜2 ≤ I(T ∧XY |U),
R˜0 + R˜1 + R˜2 ≤ I(T ∧XY ).
Assume that for some 0 < η < I∗ := min{Iν > 0 : ν = 1, 2, 3, 4} we have
n logL1 + n
′ logL′1
n+ n′
≤ [I(T ∧X |Y U)− η ]+,
n logL2 + n
′ logL′2
n+ n′
≤ [I(T ∧ Y |XU)− η ]+,
n log(L1L2) + n
′ log(L′1L
′
2)
n+ n′
≤ [I(T ∧XY |U)− η ]+,
n log(L0L1L2) + n
′ log(L′0L
′
1L
′
2)
n+ n′
≤ [I(T ∧XY )− η ]+.
Define a new family of random vectors
F ◦F ′ := {U˜ l0l
′
0 , X˜ l0l
′
0l1l
′
1 , Y˜ l0l
′
0l2l
′
2}
by concatenating the corresponding elements of F and F ′, so e.g. U˜ l0l
′
0 =
(U l0 , U l
′
0) ∈ U n+n
′
, X˜ l0l
′
0l1l
′
1 = (X l0l1 , X l
′
0l
′
1) ∈ X n+n
′
.
Lemma 4.18. For any δ, η > 0 there are ζ1, ζ2 = ζ1(η, δ), ζ2(η, δ) > 0 such that
the probability of the event AMAC that the family
{X˜ l0l
′
0l1l
′
1 , Y˜ l0l
′
0l2l
′
2 : (l0, l
′
0, l1, l
′
1, l2, l
′
2)}
is the codeword set of a deterministic MAC code with average error at most
exp(−(n+ n′)ζ1) is lower-bounded by 1 − exp(−(n + n
′)ζ2). The same result is
true if it is formulated only for F or F ′ without concatenation.
Proof. The difference to standard random coding proofs is that the random
variables from F and F ′ are conditioned on typicality. Using the random sets
El0l
′
0l1l
′
1l2l
′
2 := {t ∈ T n : (U˜ l0l
′
0 , X˜ l0l
′
0l1l
′
1 , Y˜ l0l
′
0l2l
′
2 , t) ∈ T nUXY T,δ},
we define the decoding sets F l0l
′
0l1l
′
1l2l
′
2 by deciding for (l0, l
′
0, l1, l
′
1, l2, l
′
2) if the
output is contained in El0l
′
0l1l
′
1l2l
′
2 and if at the same time it is not contained in
any E l˜0 l˜
′
0 l˜1 l˜
′
1 l˜2 l˜
′
2 for a different message tuple (l˜0, l˜
′
0, l˜1, l˜
′
1, l˜2, l˜
′
2). This decoder is
known to be the right decoder in the case where the codewords have the standard
i.i.d. structure, i.e. for a family of random variables
{Uˆ l0l
′
0 , Xˆ l0l
′
0l1l
′
1 , Y l0l
′
0l2l
′
2}
where Uˆ l0l
′
0 ∼ P
⊗(n+n′)
U and where conditional on Uˆ
l0l
′
0 , the Xˆ l0l
′
0l1l
′
1 and Yˆ l0l
′
0l2l
′
2
are independent with Xˆ l0l
′
0l1l
′
1 ∼ P
⊗(n+n′)
X|U and Yˆ
l0l
′
0l2l
′
2 ∼ P
⊗(n+n′)
Y |U . It is easily
seen that
E[W⊗n((F l0l
′
0l1l
′
1l2l
′
2)c|X˜ l0l
′
0l1l
′
1 , Y˜ l0l
′
0l2l
′
2)]
≤ (1− 2−ncδ
2
)3(1 − 2−n
′cδ2)3E[W⊗n((F l0l
′
0l1l
′
1l2l
′
2)c|Xˆ l0l
′
0l1l
′
1 , Yˆ l0l
′
0l2l
′
2)].
Then the standard random coding proof technique yields the result. The spe-
cialization for the case that only F or F ′ is treated is obvious. ⊓⊔
4.5 Coding
In this subsection we show the achievability of the rate sets R(ν)(p) for ν =
0, 1, 2, 3 and appropriate p. For the cases where we showed that R(ν)(p) can be
written as the union over certain α of rate sets R
(ν)
α (p), we show the achievability
of the latter for every α.
Throughout this section fix a common randomness bound HC ≥ 0. Let δ > 0
which will be specified later and n a blocklength which will have to be large
enough. Every p considered in this section has the form p = PU⊗(PX|U⊗PY |U )⊗
W . Without loss of generality we may assume that I(Z ∧XY ) < I(T ∧XY ), in
particular, I(T ∧XY ) > 0. Letting
K0,K1,K2, L0, L1, L2, n, K
′
0,K
′
1,K
′
2, L
′
0, L
′
1, L
′
2, n
′ (71)
be arbitrary positive integers, we define two independent families G ,G ′ of ran-
dom vectors. G has the same form as F with the parameters L0, L1, L2 replaced
by K0L0,K1L1,K2L2. G ′ is defined analogously with the parameters on the
left-hand side of (71) replaced by those on its right-hand side. Every choice of
(k0, k1, k2) induces a subfamily F of G which has the same parameters as the
F treated above, every subfamily of G ′ corresponding to any (k′0, k
′
1, k
′
2) induces
an F ′ with parameters L′0, L
′
1, L
′
2, n
′. Further recall the notation G ◦ G ′ as the
family of concatenated words from G and G ′.
Case 0 and 1: Let p ∈ Π0 or p ∈ Π
(1)
HC
. Note that α
(1)
0 ≤ α
(1)
1 if and only if the
vector (J
(α)
0 , J
(α)
1 , J
(α)
2 ) whose components are given by
J
(α)
0 = I(Z ∧ U),
J
(α)
1 = αI(Z ∧X |Y U) + (1− α)I(Z ∧X |U),
J
(α)
2 = αI(Z ∧ Y |U) + (1 − α)I(Z ∧ Y |XU)
is contained in R˜(p). We first consider Case 1. Let a rate vector (R0, R1, R2)
with positive components be given such that (R˜0, R˜1, R˜2) := (R0, R1, R2) +
(J
(α)
0 , J
(α)
1 , J
(α)
2 ) ∈ R˜(p), which means that (R0, R1, R2) ∈ Rα(p). We now
define a wiretap code whose rates approximate (R0, R1, R2). If α = 0, we only
need G ′, if α = 1, we only need G . Otherwise we do time-sharing in the following
way: choose for a small 0 < γ < min{α, 1 − α} blocklengths n and n′ with
n/(n + n′) ∈ (α − γ, α + γ). For some 0 < 2η < min{R0, R1, R2} and every
ν = 0, 1, 2 let
R˜ν − η ≤
log(KνLν) + log(K
′
νL
′
ν)
n+ n′
≤ R˜ν −
η
2
(and this modifies accordingly for α ∈ {0, 1}). By Lemma 4.18 we know that
with probability exponentially close to 1, the random variables X˜
l0l
′
0l1l
′
1
k0k′0k1k
′
1
and
Y˜
l0l
′
0l2l
′
2
k0k′0k2k
′
2
form the codewords of a code for the non-wiretap MAC given by Wb
with an average error at most exp(−(n + n′)ζ1) for some ζ1 > 0. We denote
Bob’s corresponding random decoder by Φ. Now let
logL1 + logL
′
1
n+ n′
∈ J
(α)
1 +
(
f1(δ) + (αf2(δ) + (1− α)f4(δ))
)
· [2, 3],
logL2 + logL
′
2
n+ n′
∈ J
(α)
2 +
(
f1(δ) + (αf4(δ) + (1− α)f2(δ))
)
· [2, 3],
logL0 + logL
′
0
n+ n′
∈ J
(α)
0 +
(
f4(δ) + f6(δ)
)
· [2, 3].
This is possible if 4(f1(δ) + f2(δ) + f4(δ)) ≤ min{η,HC − J
(α)
0 }. If additionally
ε is chosen according to
−
1
n
log ε =
1
4
min{4ζ1, f1(δ) + f2(δ) + f4(δ) + f6(δ)},
then for every (k0, k1, k2) ∈ [K0] × [K1] × [K2], the corresponding subfamily
F of G satisfies (33)-(36) with probability exponentially close to 1, and for
every (k′0, k
′
1, k
′
2) ∈ [K
′
0] × [K
′
1] × [K
′
2], the corresponding subfamily F
′ of G ′
satisfies (33′)-(36′) with probability exponentially close to 1. Thus we can choose
a realization of G ◦ G ′ which has all these properties and use it to define a
stochastic wiretap code. We define independent encoders G and G′ by setting
G0(l0|k0) =
1
L0
, (k0 ∈ [K0], l0 ∈ [L0]),
G1(x|k0, k1, l0) =
1
L1
∑
l1
δ
x
l0l1
k0k1
(x), (x ∈ X n, k1 ∈ [K1], k0 ∈ [K0], l0 ∈ [L0]),
G2(y|k0, k2, l0) =
1
L2
∑
l2
δ
y
l0l2
k0k2
(y), (y ∈ Y n, k2 ∈ [K2], k0 ∈ [K0], l0 ∈ [L0]),
and defining G′ analogously. G0 and G
′
0 satisfy the common randomness con-
straint. We choose the decoder ϕ to be the realization of Φ corresponding to the
chosen realization of G ◦ G ′. The average error of the stochastic encoding code
equals the average error of the deterministic MAC code for Wb determined by
the realization of G ◦ G ′, in particular it is bounded by ε. Due to the choice of
δ the rates of this code satisfy
logKν + logK
′
ν
n+ n′
≥ Rν − 2η (ν = 0, 1, 2, ).
Finally if we let Mν be uniformly distributed on [Kν ] and M
′
ν on [K
′
ν ], then
it follows from Lemma 4.11 and (22) together with the fact that ε is exponen-
tially small that the strong secrecy criterion is satisfied. Thus the rate triple
(R0, R1, R2) is achievable. So far, this excludes (R0, R1, R2) where one compo-
nent equals zero, but as δ and η may be arbitrarily close to 0 and the achievable
region ofW is closed by definition, we can conclude that the whole region Rα(p)
is achievable.
For Case 0, everything goes through if one sets K0 = K
′
0 = L0 = L
′
0 = 1
and R0 = 0. The difference to Case 1 is that even if J
(α)
0 = 0, one needs a little
bit more common randomness than that in order to protect a common message,
as can be seen in the choice of L0 and L
′
0 above. Thus the transmission of a
common message is impossible if common randomness is not available.
Case 2: Let p ∈ Π
(2)
HC
. In this case we generally need both a G and a G ′, where
G has L2 = 1 and G ′ has L1 = 1. We define the vector (J
(α)
0 , J
(α)
1 , J
(α)
2 ) by
J
(α)
0 = αI(Z ∧ Y U) + (1− α)I(Z ∧XU),
J
(α)
1 = αI(Z ∧X |Y U),
J
(α)
2 = (1 − α)I(Z ∧ Y |XU)
As it should always be clear which case we are treating, this should not lead to
confusion with case 1. Note that α
(2)
0 ≤ α ≤ α
(2)
1 if and only if (J
(α)
0 , J
(α)
1 , J
(α)
2 )
is contained in R˜(p) and satisfies J
(α)
0 < HC . Let a rate vector (R0, R1, R2) be
given whose ν-th component may only vanish if Lν = L
′
ν = 1. Further we require
that (R˜0, R˜1, R˜2) = (R0, R1, R2)+ (J
(α)
0 , J
(α)
1 , J
(α)
2 ) is contained in R˜(p). If α =
0, we only need G ′, if α = 1, we only need G . Otherwise, let 0 < γ < min{α, 1−α}
be small and let n and n′ be large enough such that n/(n+n′) ∈ (α− γ, α+ γ).
Further for some 0 < 2η < min{Rν : ν = 0, 1, 2, Rν > 0} let
[R˜ν − η]+ ≤
log(KνLν) + log(K
′
νL
′
ν)
n+ n′
≤ [R˜ν −
η
2
]+,
and modify this accordingly for α ∈ {0, 1}. By Lemma 4.18 we know that
with probability exponentially close to 1, the random variables X˜
l0l
′
0l1l
′
1
k0k′0k1k
′
1
and
Y˜
l0l
′
0l2l
′
2
k0k′0k2k
′
2
form the codewords of a code for the non-wiretap MAC given by Wb
with an average error at most exp(−(n+ n′)ζ1) for some ζ1 > 0. We denote the
corresponding random decoder by Φ. We define (j11 , j
2
1) = (j
1
2 , j
2
2) = (1, 2) and
(j10 , j
2
0) = (1, 6). Then let for ν = 0, 1, 2
J (α)ν + 2(fj1ν (δ) + fj2ν (δ)) ≤
logLν + logL
′
ν
n+ n′
≤ J (α)ν + 3(fj1ν (δ) + fj2ν (δ)),
which is possible if 4(fj1ν (δ)+fj2ν (δ)) ≤ min{η,HC−J
(α)
0 } for all ν. If additionally
ε is chosen according to
−
1
n
log ε =
1
4
min{4ζ1, f1(δ) + f2(δ), f1(δ) + f6(δ)},
then for every (k0, k1, k2) ∈ [K0] × [K1] × [K2], the corresponding subfamily
F of G satisfies (53)-(55) with probability exponentially close to 1, and for
every (k′0, k
′
1, k
′
2) ∈ [K
′
0] × [K
′
1] × [K
′
2], the corresponding subfamily F
′ of G ′
satisfies (53′)-(55′) with probability exponentially close to 1. Thus we can choose
a realization of G ◦ G ′ which has all these properties plus those defining AMAC
and use it to define a stochastic wiretap code. We define independent encoders
G and G′ by setting
G0(l0|k0) =
1
L0
, (l0 ∈ [L0], k0 ∈ [K0]),
G1(x|k0, k1, l0) =
1
L1
∑
l1
δ
x
l0l1
k0k1
(x), (x ∈ X n, k1 ∈ [K1], k0 ∈ [K0], l0 ∈ [L0]),
G2(y|k0, k2, l0) = δ
y
l0
k0k2
(y), (y ∈ Y n, k2 ∈ [K2], k0 ∈ [K0], l0 ∈ [L0]),
and defining G′ analogously. The decoder ϕ is the realization of Φ corresponding
to the chosen realization of G ◦ G ′. G0 and G′0 satisfy the common randomness
constraint. Due to the simple form ofG andG′, the average error of the stochastic
encoding code equals the average error of the deterministic MAC code for Wb
determined by the realization of G ◦G ′, in particular it is bounded by ε. Due to
the choice of δ, the rates of this code satisfy
logKν + logK
′
ν
n+ n′
≥ Rν − 2η (ν = 0, 1, 2, ).
Finally if we let Mν be uniformly distributed on [Kν ] and M
′
ν on [K
′
ν ], then
it follows from Lemma 4.11 and (22) together with the fact that ε is expo-
nentially small that the strong secrecy criterion is satisfied. Thus the rate triple
(R0, R1, R2) is achievable. So far, this may exclude rate triples (R0, R1, R2) where
one component equals zero, but as δ and η may be arbitrarily close to 0 and the
achievable region of W is closed by definition, we can conclude that the whole
region Rα(p) is achievable.
Case 3: In this case we only need G with L1 = L2 = 1. Let R0 > 0 and assume
that the rate vector (R˜0, R˜1, R˜2) := (R0 + I(Z ∧ XY ), R1, R2) is contained in
R˜(p). Further for some 0 < 2η < min{Rν : ν = 0, 1, 2, Rν > 0} let
[R˜ν − η]+ ≤
1
n
log(KνLν) ≤ [R˜ν −
η
2
]+.
G satisfiesAMAC with probability exponentially close to 1, so theX
l0l1
k0k1
and Y l0l2k0k2
form the codewords of a deterministic non-wiretap MAC code whose average
error for transmission over Wb is bounded by exp(−nζ1) for some ζ1 > 0. We
denote the corresponding random decoder by Φ. Now let
I(Z ∧XY ) + 2(f1(δ) + f2(δ)) ≤
1
n
logL0 ≤ I(Z ∧XY ) + 3(f1(δ) + f2(δ))
for δ so small that 4(f1(δ)+f2(δ)) ≤ min(η,HC−I(Z∧XY )) and choose ε such
that
−
1
n
log ε =
1
4
min{4ζ1, f1(δ) + f2(δ)}.
Then for every (k0, k1, k2) the corresponding family F satisfies the conditions
(62) and (63) with probability exponentially close to 1. We choose a realization
{(ul0k0 ,x
l0
k0k1
,yl0k0k2)} which satisfies the conditions of (62) and (63) and which
determines a deterministic non-wiretap code for Wb with decoder ϕ. Now we
can define a wiretap code whose decoder is ϕ and whose stochastic encoder G is
given by
G0(l0|k0) =
1
L0
, (k0 ∈ [K0], l0 ∈ [L0]),
G1(x|k0, k1, l0) = δ
x
l0
k0k1
(x), (x ∈ X n, k1 ∈ [K1], k0 ∈ [K0], l0 ∈ [L0]),
G2(y|k0, k2, l0) = δ
y
l0
k0k2
(y), (y ∈ Y n, k2 ∈ [K2], k0 ∈ [K0], l0 ∈ [L0]).
Note that G0 satisfies the common randomness constraint. Due to the uniform
distribution of G0, its average error is identical to that of the deterministic MAC
code determined by the xl0k0k1 and the y
l0
k0k2
, in particular, it is exponentially
small with rate at most ε. We have for ν = 0, 1, 2
1
n
logKν ≥ Rν − 2η.
due to the choice of δ. Finally if we let Mν be uniformly distributed on [Kν ],
then it follows from Lemma 4.17 and (22) together with the fact that ε is expo-
nentially small that the strong secrecy criterion is satisfied. Thus the rate triple
(R0, R1, R2), and hence R(p), is achievable.
4.6 Concluding Steps
We can reduce coding for a general p which is the distribution of a random vector
(U, V1, V2, X, Y, T, Z) to the case treated above by constructing a new wiretap
MAC as follows: its input alphabets are V1 and V2, its output alphabets still
are T and Z . The transition probability for inputs (v1, v2) and outputs (t, z) is
given by
W˜ (t, z|v1, v2) :=
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
W (t, z|x, y)PX|V1(x|v1)PY |V2(y|v2).
For this channel we do the same construction as above considering the joint
distribution of random variables (U, V1, V2, T, Z) which we denote by p˜. In this
way we also construct a wiretap code for the original channel W because the
additional randomness PV1V2|U can be integrated into the stochastic encoders G1
and G2. G0 remains unchanged, so the additional randomness in the encoders
does not increase the common randomness needed to do the encoding.
On the other hand, we need to show that the rate regions thus obtained are
those appearing in the statement of Theorem 3.1. As the sets Π0, Π
(1)
HC
, . . . , Π
(3)
HC
depend on the channel, we write Π0(W ), Π0(W˜ ), Π
(1)
HC
(W ), . . . , Π
(3)
HC
(W˜ ). Note
that p˜ is contained in Π0(W˜ ) or Π
(ν)
HC
(W˜ ) for some ν = 1, 2, 3 if and only if p is
contained in the corresponding Π0(W ) or Π
(ν)
HC
(W ). This immediately implies
that the rate regions also coincide.
5 Proof of Theorem 3.5
5.1 Elementary Rate Regions
As for the wiretap MAC with common message we show that we can write the
claimed achievable regions as unions of simpler sets whose achievability will be
show in the next step.
For Case 1: Define
β
(1)
0 := [1−
C2
I(Z ∧ U)
]+, β
(1)
1 := min{
C1
I(Z ∧ U)
, 1}.
We have β
(1)
0 ≤ β
(1)
1 because I(Z ∧ U) < C1 + C2.
Lemma 5.1. For β
(1)
0 ≤ β ≤ β
(1)
1 , let R
(1)
β (p, C1, C2) be the set of those real
pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U)− I(Z ∧ V1|U)
− [I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)− I(T ∧ V2|V1U)]+ − βI(Z ∧ U) + C1,
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U)− I(Z ∧ V2|U)
− [I(Z ∧ V1|V2U)− I(T ∧ V1|V2U)]+ − (1− β)I(Z ∧ U) + C2,
R1 +R2 ≤ min
{
I(T ∧ V1V2|U)− I(Z ∧ V1V2|U)− I(Z ∧ U) + C1 + C2,
I(T ∧ V1V2)− I(Z ∧ V1V2)
}
.
Then
R(1)(p, C1, C2) =
⋃
β
(1)
0 ≤β≤β
(1)
1
R
(1)
β (p, C1, C2).
Thus it is sufficient to show the achievability of R
(1)
β (p, C1, C2) for every β.
For the proof one uses Lemma 4.2.
For Case 2: Recall the vector (J
(α)
0 , J
(α)
1 , J
(α)
2 ) defined as in Case 2 from the
common message part. Define
β
(2,α)
0 := [1−
C2
J
(α)
0
]+, β
(2,α)
1 := min{
C1
J
(α)
0
, 1}.
We show that every R
(2)
α (p, C1, C2) can be represented as the union of sets
R
(2)
α,β(p, C1, C2) for β
(2,α)
0 ≤ β ≤ β
(2,α)
1 . Define R
(2)
α,β(p, C1, C2) by
R1 ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U)− αI(Z ∧ V1|V2U) + C1 − βJ
(α)
0 ,
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U)− (1− α)I(Z ∧ V2|V1U) + C2 − (1− β)J
(α)
0 ,
R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2|U)− αI(Z ∧ V1|V2U)− (1− α)I(Z ∧ V2|V1U)
+ C1 + C2 − J
(α)
0 ,
R1 +R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V1V2)− I(Z ∧ V1V2).
Lemma 5.2. We have for every α ∈ [α
(2)
0 , α
(2)
1 ]
R(2)α (p, C1, C2) =
⋃
β
(2,α)
0 ≤β≤β
(2,α)
1
R
(2)
α,β(p, C1, C2).
This is seen immediately using Lemma 4.2.
For Case 3: Define
β
(1)
0 := [1−
C2
I(Z ∧ V1V2)
]+, β
(1)
1 := min{
C1
I(Z ∧ V1V2)
, 1}.
We have β
(1)
0 ≤ β
(1)
1 because I(Z ∧ V1V2) < C1 + C2.
Lemma 5.3. For β
(3)
0 ≤ β ≤ β
(3)
1 , let R
(3)
β (p, C1, C2) be the set of those real
pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(T ∧ V1|V2U0) + C1 − βI(Z ∧ V1V2),
R2 ≤ I(T ∧ V2|V1U0) + C2 − (1 − β)I(Z ∧ V1V2),
R1 +R2 ≤ min
{
I(T ∧ V1V2|U) + C1 + C2 − I(Z ∧ V1V2),
I(T ∧ V1V2)− I(Z ∧ V1V2)
}
.
Then
R(1)(p, C1, C2) =
⋃
β
(1)
0 ≤β≤β
(1)
1
R
(1)
β (p, C1, C2).
Thus it is sufficient to show the achievability of R
(3)
β (p, C1, C2) for every β.
For the proof one uses Lemma 4.2.
5.2 Coding
Let C1, C2 > 0 and let p ∈ ΠC1+C2 . Further let (R1, R2) ∈ R(p, C1, C2). In
Case 1 we then know that there is a β ∈ [β
(1)
0 , β
(1)
1 ] such that (R1, R2) ∈
R
(1)
β (p, C1, C2), in Case 2 we have an α ∈ [α
(2)
0 , α
(2)
1 ] and a β ∈ [β
(2,α)
0 , β
(2,α)
1 ]
with (R1, R2) ∈ R
(2)
α,β(p, C1, C2). For Case 3, there is a β ∈ [β
(3)
0 , β
(3)
1 ] with
(R1, R2) ∈ R
(3)
β (p, C1, C2). Recall the notation
J
(α)
0 =


I(Z ∧ U) in Case 1,
αI(Z ∧ V2U) + (1− α)I(Z ∧ V1U) in Case 2,
I(Z ∧ V1V2) in Case 3.
We set
R˜
(1)
0 := R1 ∧ (C1 − βJ
(α)
0 ), R˜
(2)
0 := R2 ∧ (C2 − (1− β)J
(α)
0 )
and
R˜ν := Rν − R˜
(ν)
0 (ν = 1, 2).
Then setting
R˜0 := R˜
(1)
0 + R˜
(2)
0 ,
we conclude that
(R˜0, R˜1, R˜2) ∈


R
(1)
β (p) in Case 1,
R
(2)
α,β(p) in Case 2,
R
(3)
β (p) in Case 3.
In particular, (R˜0, R˜1, R˜2) is achievable by the wiretap MAC W with common
message under the common randomness bound C1+C2. That means that for any
η, ε > 0 and for sufficiently large n, there is a common-message blocklength-n
code which has the form
G˜ : [K˜0]× [K˜1]× [K˜2]→ P(X
n × Y n),
ϕ : T n → [K˜0]× [K˜1]× [K˜2],
and the proof of Theorem 3.1 shows that we may assume that G˜ is given by
G˜(x,y|k˜0, k˜1, k˜2) =
1
L˜0
L˜0∑
l0=1
G˜1(x|k˜0, k˜1, l0)G˜2(y|k˜0, k˜2, l0)
for two stochastic matrices G˜1, G˜2. For L˜0 we have the bounds
J
(α)
0 +
η
4
≤
1
n
log L˜0 ≤ J
(α)
0 +
η
2
.
Without loss of generality we may additionally assume that L˜
(1)
0 := L˜
β
0 and
L˜
(2)
0 := L˜
(1−β)
0 are integers. If 0 < 2η < min{R˜ν : ν = 0, 1, 2, R˜ν > 0}, the
codelength triple (K˜0, K˜1, K˜2) may be assumed to satisfy
[R˜ν − 2η]+ ≤
1
n
log K˜ν ≤ [R˜ν − η]+, (ν = 0, 1, 2), (72)
and both the average error as well as I(M˜0M˜1M˜2 ∧ Z
n) are upper-bounded by
ε, where (M˜0, M˜1, M˜2) is distributed uniformly on [K˜0]× [K˜1]× [K˜2] and Z
n is
Eve’s corresponding output random variable. The definitions imply that
1
n
log K˜0L˜0 ≤ C1 + C2.
We can find K˜ ′0, K˜
(1)
0 , K˜
(2)
0 such that K˜
′
0 = K˜
(1)
0 K˜
(2)
0 and K˜
′
0 ≤ K˜0 and satisfying
[R˜
(ν)
0 − 2η]+ ≤
1
n
log K˜
(ν)
0 ≤ [R˜
(ν)
0 −
η
2
]+, (73)
[R˜0 − 2η]+ ≤
1
n
log K˜ ′0. (74)
Thus one obtains a natural embedding
[K˜
(ν)
0 ]× [L
(ν)
0 ] ⊂ [⌊2
nCν⌋] (ν = 1, 2). (75)
We now construct a wiretap code with conferencing encoders. Let
Kν := K˜
(ν)
0 K˜ν (ν = 1, 2).
Thus every kν ∈ [Kν ] has the form (aν(kν), bν(kν)) with aν(kν) ∈ [K˜
(ν)
0 ] and
bν(kν) ∈ [K˜ν ]. We then define a stochastic one-shot Willems conferencing pro-
tocol
c1 : [K1]→ P([⌊2
nC1⌋]), c2 : [K2]→ P([⌊2
nC2⌋])
which is used to generate both a common message as well as common ran-
domness. Given a message kν ∈ [Kν ], Aliceν chooses an lν uniformly at ran-
dom from the set [L
(ν)
0 ] and then maps the pair (kν , lν) to (aν(kν), lν), so
cν(kν , lν) = (aν(kν), lν).
Next we define stochastic encoders G1, G2 as in the definition of a code with
conferencing encoders by setting
J := [⌊2nC1⌋]× [⌊2nC2⌋]
and, using the embedding (75),
G1(x|k1, j) = G˜1(x|(a1(k1), k
(2)
0 ), b1(k1), (l1, l2))
if j = ((a1(k1), l1), (k
(2)
0 , l2)) and letting G1(x|k1, j) be arbitrary else; G2 is de-
fined analogously. For decoding, one takes the decoder from the common message
code and lets it combine the messages it receives into elements of [K1] and [K2].
By (72), the numbers K1 and K2 satisfy
1
n
logK1 ≥ R1 − 3η,
1
n
logK2 ≥ R2 − 3η.
Thus depending on the case we are in, every rate pair (R1, R2) contained in
R
(1)
β (p, C1, C2) or R
(2)
α,β(p, C1, C2) or R
(3)
β (p, C1, C2) is achievable.
6 Discussion
6.1 Conferencing and Secret Transmission
This subsection is devoted to the comparison of the wiretap MAC without confer-
encing nor common randomness and the wiretap MAC if conferencing is allowed.
As our focus is on conferencing, we assume that common randomness can only
be established by conferencing. We show that there exists a wiretap MAC where
the only rate pair contained in the region (10) achievable without conferencing
is (0, 0), whereas if conferencing is enabled with arbitrarily small C1, C2 > 0,
then the corresponding achievable region contains positive rates. Note that this
does not mean that there are cases where conferencing is necessary to establish
secret transmission as we do not have a converse. This restriction limits the use
of this discussion and should be kept in mind.
Our goal is to find multiple access channels Wb and We such that for every
Markov chain ((V1, V2), (X,Y ), (T, Z)) where PT |XY = Wb and PZ|XY = We
and where V1 and V2 are independent one has
I(T ∧ V1V2) ≤ I(Z ∧ V1V2). (76)
We noted in Remark 3.8 that (10) is the achievable region without conferencing
and it is easy to see that condition (76) is an equivalent condition for this region
to equal {(0, 0)}. Thus the only rate pair which is achievable according to our
above considerations is (R1, R2) = (0, 0). At the same time, there should be a
Markov chain (U, (X,Y ), (T, Z)) for the same pair of channels Wb and We such
that
I(T ∧XY ) > I(Z ∧XY ).
This would prove the existence of a rate pair (R1, R2) with positive components
for arbitrary C1, C2 > 0.
We recall one concept of comparison for single-sender discrete memoryless
channels (DMCs) introduced by Ko¨rner and Marton [22].
Definition 6.1. A DMC We : X → P(Z ) is less noisy than a DMC Wb :
X → P(T ) if for every Markov chain (U,X, (T, Z)) with PT |X = Wb and
PZ|X =We one has
I(Z ∧ U) ≥ I(T ∧ U).
It was observed by van Dijk [35] that this is nothing but saying that the function
PX 7→ I(Z ∧X)− I(T ∧X), PX ∈ P(X )
is concave. Now we generalize this to the MAC case to obtain an equivalent
condition for (76).
Lemma 6.2. (76) holds for every Markov chain ((V1, V2), (X,Y ), (T, Z)) with
independent V1, V2 and X independent of V2 and Y independent of V1 and
PT |XY =Wb and PZ|XY = We if and only if the function
(PX , PY ) 7→ I(Z ∧XY )− I(T ∧XY ), X, Y independent r.v.s on X × Y
is concave in each of its components.
Proof. Let a Markov chain be given as required in the lemma. One has
I(Z ∧ V1V2)− I(T ∧ V1V2) (77)
=
(
I(Z ∧XY )− I(T ∧XY )
)
−
(
I(Z ∧XY |V1V2)− I(T ∧XY |V1V2)
)
.
Now note that the rightmost bracket equals
∑
v1
∑
v2
PV1(v1)PV2 (v2)
(
I(Z ∧XY |V1 = v1, V2 = v2)− I(T ∧XY |V1 = v1, V2 = v2)
)
,
so it is clear that the nonnegativity of (77) is equivalent to the concavity in each
component of the function from the lemma statement. ⊓⊔
We now define the channels Wb and We which will provide the desired exam-
ple. Let N1, N2 be i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed on {0, 1}. The
input alphabets are X = Y = {0, 1}. The output alphabet of Wb is GF (3) and
the output alphabet of We is {−2, . . . , 3}. The outputs t of Wb are given by
t = x+ y +N1,
those of We by
z = 2x− 2y +N2.
The intuition is that in We, one can exactly determine through the output
whether or not the inputs were equal and if they were unequal, which input
was 0 and which was 1. For Wb, however, there are for every output at least two
input possibilities, so it is reasonable that an independent choice of the inputs
makes We better than Wb. However, if one may choose the inputs with some
correlation, one may choose the inputs to be equal. Then the output of We is
only noise, whereas one can still extract some information about the input from
Wb.
As the entries of the corresponding stochastic matrices of both channels are
only 1/2 or 0, the conditional output entropy is independent of the input distri-
bution and equals 1. Further any pair of independent random variables on X
and Y is given by parameters q, r ∈ [0, 1] such that
P[X(q) = 0] = q, P[Y (r) = 0] = r.
Thus in order to determine whether (76) holds, it is enough to consider the
function H(Z(q,r))−H(T (q,r)) for T (q,r), Z(q,r) being the outputs ofWb and We,
respectively, corresponding to the pair (X(q), Y (r)). One has
fZ(q, r) := H(Z
(q,r)) = −q(1− r) log(q(1 − r)/2)
−(qr + (1− q)(1− r)) log((qr + (1− q)(1 − r))/2)
−(1− q)r log((1 − q)r/2)
and
fT (q, r) := H(T
(q,r))
= −
1
2
(qr + (1− q)(1− r)) log((qr + (1− q)(1− r))/2)
−
1
2
(qr + q(1− r) + (1 − q)r) log((qr + q(1− r) + (1− q)r)/2)
−
1
2
(q(1 − r) + (1− q)r + (1− q)(1 − r))·
· log((q(1 − r) + (1− q)r + (1 − q)(1− r))/2).
Both entropies are symmetric in q and r and continuous on [0, 1]2 and differen-
tiable on (0, 1)2, so by Lemma 6.2 it suffices to find the second derivatives in q
of both of them and to compare.
We have
∂fZ
∂q
(q, r) =− (1 − r) log(q(1− r)/2)
− (2r − 1) log((qr + (1− q)(1 − r))/2)
+ r log((1 − q)r/2)
and
∂fT
∂q
(q, r) = −
1
2
(2r − 1) log((qr + (1− q)(1 − r))/2)
−
1
2
(1 − r) log((qr + q(1− r) + (1 − q)r)/2)
+
r
2
log((q(1 − r) + (1− q)r + (1− q)(1− r))/2).
Thus
∂2fZ
∂q2
(q, r) = −
1− r
q
−
(2r − 1)2
qr + (1 − q)(1− r)
−
r
1− q
and
∂2fT
∂q2
(q, r) = −
(2r − 1)2
2(qr + (1− q)(1 − r))
−
(1 − r)2
2(qr + q(1− r) + (1− q)r)
−
r2
2(q(1− r) + (1 − q)r + (1 − q)(1− r))
.
After some algebra, it turns out that for q, r ∈ (0, 1),
∂2fZ
∂q2
(q, r) −
∂2fT
∂q2
(q, r) = −
1− r
2q
·
q + 2r − qr
q + r − qr
−
(2r − 1)2
2(qr + (1− q)(1 − r))
−
r
2(1− q)
·
2− r − qr
1− qr
< 0.
Thus fZ − fT is concave and (76) is true for Wb,We.
Now we show that there exists an input distribution with I(T ∧ XY ) >
I(Z ∧XY ). Of course, X and Y cannot be independent any more in this case.
Every probability distribution p on {0, 1} induces a probability distribution p2
on {0, 1}2 via p2(x, x) = p(x). Let the pair (X,Y ) be distributed according to
p. It is immediate from the definition of We that I(Z ∧XY ) = 0. On the other
hand, PT can be described by the vector (1/2)(1, p(0), p(1)). Thus one sees easily
that this is maximized for p(0) = p(1) = 1/2, resulting in
I(T ∧XY ) =
1
2
.
p2 is identified as an element of Π by setting U = {0, 1}, PU = PX , and
PX|U = PY |U = δU . Note that I(Z ∧ U) = 0, so secret transmission is possible
with arbitrarily small conferencing capacities C1, C2 > 0.
6.2 Necessity of Time-Sharing in Random Coding
We show here that doing time-sharing during random coding is necessary for
our method to work. This only serves to justify the effort we had to make in
coding. We concentrate on Case 0 and 1. Then we have to show that it may
happen that α
(1)
0 > 0 or α
(1)
1 < 1. Let X = Y = T = Z = {0, 1} and let
Wb,We : {0, 1}
2 → P({0, 1}) be defined by
Wb =


0.6178 0.3822
0.0624 0.9376
0.9350 0.0650
0.2353 0.7647

 , We =


0.0729 0.9271
0.7264 0.2736
0.3662 0.6338
0.4643 0.5357

 ,
where the output distribution for the input pair (x, y) is given in row number
2x + y for each matrix. With q = 0.6933 and r = 0.3151, let p = p(q) ⊗ p(r) ∈
P(X × Y ) be the product measure with the marginals
p(q) = (q, 1− q), p(r) = (r, 1− r).
Note that p ∈ Π0. One obtains the following entropies:
H(T |XY ) ≈ 0.5685, H(Z|XY ) ≈ 0.7851,
H(T |X) ≈ 0.8532, H(Z|X) ≈ 0.9952,
H(T |Y ) ≈ 0.6251, H(Z|Y ) ≈ 0.8442,
H(T ) ≈ 0.8866, H(Z) ≈ 0.9999.
Calculating with the above values returns
I(T ∧XY ) = 0.3181, I(Z ∧XY ) = 0.2147,
I(T ∧X |Y ) = 0.0566, I(Z ∧X |Y ) = 0.0590,
I(T ∧ Y |X) = 0.2847, I(Z ∧ Y |X) = 0.2101,
I(Z ∧X) = 0.0047,
I(Z ∧ Y ) = 0.1557.
Thus the conditions (3) and (4) are satisfied. If HC < min{I(Z ∧ X |Y ), I(Z ∧
Y |X)} = 0.0590, then we can only show that R(0)(p) or R(1)(p) is achievable
and might have to use time-sharing during random coding to do so. In fact, this
is necessary as
I(Z ∧X |Y ) > I(T ∧X |Y ),
whereas
I(Z ∧ Y |X) < I(T ∧ Y |X).
Hence α
(1)
0 > 0, but α
(1)
1 = 1. This example was found by a brute-force search
using the computer.
A Proof of Lemma 4.2
The direction “⊂” in (12) is obvious. For the other direction, let (R0, R1, R2) ∈
K . We may assume that for some 0 ≤ β ≤ 1,
R1 = r1 − β(α1a1 + (1− α1)b1)− (1 − β)(α0a1 + (1− α0)b1)
= r1 − (βα1 + (1− β)α0)a1 − (β(1 − α1) + (1− β)(1 − α0))b1
because the claim is obvious for R1 ≤ r1 − α1a1 − (1 − α1)b1. We show that
(R0, R1, R2) ∈ Kβα1+(1−β)α0 . The R1-bound is satisfied due to our assumption.
Further due to the bound on R1 +R2,
R2
≤ r12 − c− r1 + (βα1 + (1− β)α0)a1 + (β(1 − α1) + (1− β)(1 − α0))b1
≤ r2 − (βα1 + (1 − β)α0)a2 − (β(1 − α1) + (1 − β)(1 − α0))b2,
so R2 also satisfies the necessary upper bound. The sum constraints are indepen-
dent of α. Hence all upper bounds in the definition of Kβα1+(1−β)α0 are satisfied,
and Lemma 4.2 is proved.
B Proof of Lemma 4.5
For α ∈ [α0, α1], the set Kα is contained in the convex hull of Kα0 ∪Kα1 . Thus
we only have to prove that K = conv(Kα0 ∪ Kα1). Without loss of generality
we assume that b > a.
We first prove conv(Kα0 ∪Kα1) ⊂ K . Let (R0, R1, R2) ∈ conv(Kα0 ∪Kα1).
Using the convexity of Kα0 and Kα1 we infer that there is a (R
(0)
0 , R
(0)
1 , R
(0)
2 ) ∈
Kα0 and a (R
(1)
0 , R
(1)
1 , R
(1)
2 ) ∈ Kα1 and a β ∈ [0, 1] such that
(R0, R1, R2) = β(R
(0)
0 , R
(0)
1 , R
(0)
2 ) + (1− β)(R
(1)
0 R
(1)
1 , R
(1)
2 ).
One sees immediately that (R0, R1, R2) satisfies the bounds (17)-(19) and (21).
It is sufficient to check that (20) is satisfied by the triples (R
(0)
0 , R
(0)
1 , R
(0)
2 ) and
(R
(1)
0 , R
(1)
1 , R
(1)
2 ). For (R
(0)
0 , R
(0)
1 , R
(0)
2 ) we assume that
R
(0)
1 = γ(r1 − α0a)
for some γ ∈ [0, 1]. After some calculations this yields
bR
(0)
1 + aR
(0)
2 ≤ (b− a)r1 + ar12 − ab− (1− γ)(b− a)(r1 − α0a)
≤ (b− a)r1 + ar12 − ab.
One proceeds analogously for (R
(1)
0 , R
(1)
1 , R
(1)
2 ).
Next we have to check that K ⊂ conv(Kα0 ∪Kα1). It is sufficient to check
whether those points (R0, R1, R2) are contained in conv(Kα0 ∪Kα1) that satisfy
both (20) and one of (17)-(19) with equality. So assume that
bR1 + aR2 = r12a+ r1(b − a)− ab. (78)
First we also assume that
R1 +R2 = r12 − α0a− (1− α1)b.
Then
R2 = r12 − α0a− (1 − α1)b−R1
and using (78) we obtain
R1 = r1 −
α1b− α0a
b− a
a ≤ r1 − α1a.
For R2 this gives
R2 = r12 − r1 −
(
α0 +
α1b− α0a
b− a
)
a− (1− α1)b ≤ r2 − (1− α1)b,
so (R1, R2) ∈ Kα1 .
Now we assume
R1 = r1 − α0a.
Then inserting this in (78) one obtains
R2 ≤ r2 − (1 − α0)b,
so (R1, R2) ∈ Kα0 .
Finally for
R2 = r2 − (1− α1)b
we obtain
R1 ≤ r1 − α1a,
so (R1, R2) ∈ Kα1 . This proves the lemma.
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